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270 1.  FOREWORD 
Over  the  last sixty years  the aeronautical  industry has  unquestion-
ably made  an  outstanding contribution to  technical progress. 
New  products  have  been  developed at an  exceptionally rapid rate as 
part of an  evolutionary process  which  has  been  continuous and still 
shows  no  sign of being exhausted. 
Since  the  first tentative steps at the  beginning of this century, 
aeronautical  construction  techniques  have  made  enormous  strides. 
As  regards  means  of propulsion,  the  invention of piston engines 
followed  by  turboprop  and  pure  jet types has  led to  a  succession 
of faster and  more  powerful aircraft  (Fig.  1).  At  the  same  time, 
detailed research in a  number  of directions  (aerodynamics,  struc-
tures,  solid physics,  etc.)  has resulted in the  production of aero-
planes  of  a  size,  and  capable  of speeds,  which  would  have  been 
inconceivable  only  a  few  years  ago  (Fig.  2). 
The  development  of  increasingly powerful  rockets,  combined  with 
extremely rapid progress  in other branches,  among  which electronics 
are  outstanding,  has  led  to  the  construction of missiles and  huge 
space  launchers.  With  these,  it has  been possible  to put first 
unmanned,  and  then  manned,  artificial satellites into orbit round 
the  earth;  within  twelve  years  of  the  launching of  the  first arti-
ficial satellite,  two  men  landed  on  the  moon  and  returned to earth 
after spending about  twenty  hours  on  our satellite. 
Widely  differing branches  of science  and  technology have  contrib-
uted to  this progress,  with  the  aeronautical industry acting as  a 
catalyst. 
It is unlikely,  however,  that all this would  have  been possible but 
for at least  two  other factors,  which characterize the aeronautical 
industry in varying  degree:  (a)  government  intervention and  (b)  the 
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273 devel9pment  of new  methods  of  management  and of organizing production. 
Obviously,  the  first  factor  cannot  be  regarded as peculiar to  the 
aeronautical industry;  nevertheless,  in this case,  it is not  only 
of decisive  importance  but also has  assumed highly specific  forms. 
In the aeronautical industry,  the  State plays  a  dual and  sometimes 
a  triple role: 
- it finances  and directs research and  development  concerned with 
military aircraft and  space  programmes,  and  often civil aviation 
as well; 
- it is traditionally the  main  purchaser of the products of the 
aeronautical industry; 
- it sometimes  intervenes at the  production stage,  either by holding 
capital in companies  or by  allowing  the  latter to use  premises, 
plant and  machines  almost  or  completely free  of  charge. 
The  result,  with variations of emphasis  and  direction  from  country 
to  country,  is a  permanent  partnership between  the  government  and 
the aeronautical industry. 
The  second  factor,  namely,  the  introduction and application of new 
methods  of management  and  of organizing production,  has  been equally 
decisive  for  the aeronautical industry.  With  these  methods it has 
been possible  to  carry through highly  complicated and  sophisticated 
aircraft,  missile and  space  programmes  in a  very  short  time  and at 
the  same  time  to achieve  absolute reliability for  both  components 
and  the  whole  system.  The  coordination and  specialization of the 
planning and production  stages and  the  coordination of  firms  engaged 
on  individual programmes  have  attained a  remarkable  pitch of effi-
ciency,  particularly in the United States,  where  the  impetus  given 
by  the  government  has  been  of great  importance  in thie  respect. 
We  feel that because  of  these  features  (development  of new  products 
274 and  introduction of completely  new  production and  management  tech-
niques)  the aerospace  industry's contribution to  technological prog-
ress  can  be  regarded as  decisive.  Nor  does  this important  observa-
tion cover all aspects  of the  question. 
First and  foremost,  there is the  problem  of  the  interdependence  of 
branches  of  the  economy,  regarding which it should  be  noted that: 
- today,  all the  most  technologically advanced  branches  of industry 
are linked,  directly or indirectly,  with aerospace  research and 
production,  which  indeed sparked off their development,  with  the 
consequent  impact  of all the  new  technological knowledge  on  the 
productive  system as  a  whole; 
analytical planning,  or,  as it is more  generally known,  systems 
management,  which  was  first developed in the  aerospace  industry, 
is now  spreading  to all other branches  both within and  outside 
industry,  with effects which  cannot  yet  be  assessed in material 
terms  but  will certainly be  positive in the  very near future. 
Lastly,  special reference  should  be  made  to  the  far-reaching influ-
ence  of the aerospace  industry  on  the  economics  of transport at 
national,  ~nternational and  intercontinental level and  to  the social 
and political consequences  of the  introduction and rapid spread of 
air transport. 
The  final  conclusion is that  over  these  first sixty years  of its 
existence,  the aeronautical industry has  changed  so radically and 
profoundly  from  its original formthat it now  has  no  set limits. 
For example,  it cannot  be  said that the aeronautical  industry  con-
sists exclusively of  constructors of airframes,  engines,  components 
and  equipment:  in particular,  work  on  missiles  and  space  programmes 
has  now  brought  in many  other productive  branches,  and electronics 
most  of all. 
It is therefore  very difficult,  if not  completely  impossible,  to 
275 define  the aeronautical industry,  especially as  the  techniques used 
are  changing very rapidly. 
For the  purposes  of this survey,  therefore,  our definition of the 
aeronautical industry will be  restricted to  the  traditional branches 
and  the statistical criteria adopted  by  the  countries investigated 
will be  adjusted to that definition.  Interconnections with other 
branches  of research and  production will,  however,  be  described and 
given special_mention. 
Again,  the aeronautical industry cannot  be  regarded as existing on 
its own;  due  allowance  must  also be  made  for  the  economic,  social 
and political consequences  of aerospace activities and  this we  shall 
also seek to  do  in this report. 
2.  THE  PROCESS  OF  PRODUCTION 
2.1  General Remarks 
Up  till the  Second  World  War,  aircraft were  not extremely  complex. 
Since  1945,  however,  the aeronautical industry has progressively 
developed more  and  more  sophisticated products  for  both military 
1  and civil applications  • 
2  This  evolutionary process has  involved the  use  of new  material•  , 
1 
2 
Some  of  the- main  problems  dealt with since  the  war are supersonic 
flight,  the  swing-wing aircraft,  automatic all-weather landing, 
short and vertical take-off and landing  (S/VTOL). 
In many  cases  the aeronautical industry has  made  a  decisive  con-
tribution to  the  development  of the  techniques  involved  (e.g., 
titanium). 
276 the introduction of the  traditional branches  (airframes and  engines) 
of new  technologies and advanced  construction techniques,  swift 
changes  in equipment
1  and generally greater sophistication and 
complexity in planning and production,  with consequent increases 
in the relevant  times  and  costs2• 
Missile and apace  work  was  added  to this process with a  consequent 
speeding up  of the rate of change  in certain branches3•  New  techno-
logies were  stimulated,  the reliability of components  and  systems 
was  improved and  new  methods  of  management  and  of organizing pro-
duction were  introduced at both branch and industry level. 
The  changes  which have  taken place  have  not,  however,  substantially 
altered the basic characteristics of production  in the aeronautical 
industry i.e.,  the  clear distinction between  the  airframe,  engine 
and  equipment  branches has  been maintained. 
1 
2 
Electrical,  electronic,  hydraulic and mechanical. 
According  to the Plowden Report: 
- a  Spitfire cost £10,000;  a  Lightning  Mk  1  now  costs £500,000; 
- the  development  of the TSR-2  would  have  cost £300  mi1lion and 
each single aircraft produced would  have  cost £3 million,  this 
being respectively 20 and 10  times  the  cost of the Canberra, 
which  the TSR-2  was  intended to replace; 
the  cost of developing a  modern  subsonic  commercial  jet air-
craft may  exceed £50 million,  with each single aircraft costing 
from £1,500,000 to £3 million;  these  figures are  two  or three 
times as  those  for  the  previous  ten years. 
3  .  i  e.g.,  av~on ca. 
277 At  the  same  time,  the relative importance  of the  three branches 
with respect  to  the  finished product has  changed  with the passage 
of time.  In particular,  while  the  engines branch  shows  no  appre-
ciable  change,  the airframe  branch has declined in relation to 
the  equipment  branch. 
This process is clearly demonstrated by  the  table  below,  which 
gives figures  for  a  number  of French military aircraft produced 
since  1949. 
Type  of  Flight  Airframe  Engines  Equip- Total Cost 
Aircraft  of First  ment 
Prototype  %  %  %  ,; 
Ouragan  1949  54.7  13.7  31.6  100.0 
Nord  2501  1950  42.7  20.7  36.6  100.0 
M.D.  452  1951  46.2  23.3  30.5  100.0 
Myatere  IV  A  1952  48.4  21.9  29.7  100.0 
Vautour  1952  42.4  19.1  38.5  100.0 
Super M7stare  B2  1955  48.6  22.4  29.0  100.0 
Breguet  1050 
Alize  1956  33.0  12.8  54.2  100.0 
Et.endard  IV  1958  36.5  19.5  44.0  100.0 
Mirage  IV  1959  31.2  16.8  52.0  100.0 
Mirage  III c  1960  29.2  24.2  46.6  100.0 
Mirage III E  1961  25.7  16.7  57.6  1oo  .. o 
Source:  Interavia 6/1965 
278 The  same  process  can  be  observed in the  case  of commercial air-
1  craft  ,  but is less marked  than in the  case  of military types. 
Missile and  space  programmes  have  further increased the importance 
of the  equipment  branch,  and in particular of avionics and elec-
tronics. 
2.2 The  Production Cycle  and  the  Organization of Production 
The  production  cycle  of the aeronautics industry consists basi-
cally of: 
a)  General research 
b)  Specific research and  development 
c)  Production 
The  stages of the  first phase  cannot  be  determined in advance; 
moreover,  since this research is not  directed  to  specific projects 
it does  not affect  the  direct cost of programmes. 
Specific  R&D  comprises  a  number  of separate stages,  as  follows: 
a  first stage  before production starts and  possibly a  second stage 
after the start of production. 
The  times  required  for  specific R&D  can  be  fairly accurately 
forecast at all stages;  the  first stage,  for  example,  generally 
ranges  from  six to eight years  for  the first turbojets and  from 
four  to six years  for  the  latest types  (Figs.  3  and  4). 
1  For  example,  a  comparison between  the  Caravella and the Mystere 
20  shows  that  the  share  of the airframe fell from  68  to  43~ 
~hile that of equipment  rose  from  18  to  32.2% 
279 It is interesting to  note  that times  spent  on  R&D  for similar air-
craft projects  (e.g., Trident and  B 727)  do  not  vary appreciably 
between the USA  and Europe,  up  to  the  time  of the  first flight. 
On  the  other hand,  the  time  between the first flight and  the first 
delivery is much  shorter in the  case  of American aircraft programmes, 
so that American  firms are often able to  catch up  on  the  lead ini-
tially established by  European  firms1• 
This advantage,  which,  we  repeat,  is frequently  decisive is achieved 
by  American  firms at a  stage which  should theoretically be  longer 
for them.  As  production runs are normally  much  longer than in Europe, 
2  tooling  is a  much  more  complicated process  and takes  much  longer 
to  carry out and perfect than in the  case  of European  firms. 
The  ability of American  firms  to  "catch up" at this stage must 
therefore be  due  to other factors,  which this chapter seeks to 
identity. 
Specific  R&D  can  continue  even after the aircraft has  gone  into 
production;  in such cases it is concerned  with studies for  modified 
versions of the  original aircraft. 
The  length of the production cycle  depends  on  a  number  of factors 
which are considered later.  On  average,  however,  it varies  from 
eight to ten years,  including modified versions. 
The  great length of the  complete  cycle  (14-18  years)  at once  suggests 
the  need for long-term programming in terms  of markets,  investments 
1  See,  for  example,  the Trident and  B 727  programmes. 
2  See  Section 2.4 below. 
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 and personnel and underlines,  particularly for  commercial aircraft, 
the  heavy risks associated with any project in thts field. 
Apart  from  special cases occurring in exceptional conditions1, 
the  aerona~tical industry has  always  been  characterized by  the 
production  of small  numbers  of each single  type  of aircraft.  In 
practice,  this special feature  rules  out  the possibility of fully 
automating aircraft assembly lines,  although previous stages of 
production are  automated  to  some  ex~ent (parts of airframes and 
engines). 
The  final assembly  of an aircraft does  not  therefore require large 
2 
quantities of machinery,  fixed plant and general tools  ;  on  the 
other hand,  big hangars,  large  numbers  of expensive  special tools3 
1 
2 
For  example,  the  follo~ing numbers  were  produced during  the 
Second  World  War: 
- single-engined types:  Messerschmitt  109  (over 33,000  from 
1936  to 1945; 
Focke-Wulf 190  (20,068  from  1940  to  1945); 
Spitfire  (more  than 22,000  from  1936  to  1945); 
- twin-engined  types:  Douglas  DC  3  (10,926  from  1934  to 1945); 
- four-engined  types:  Convair Liberator  (18,188  from  1939  to 1945). 
This  statement must  be  taken to be  relative; it is valid,  for 
example,  if the aeronautical industry is compared with  the  motor 
vehicle industry.  On  the  other hand,  it does  not apply in abso-
lute terms;  aircraft firms  also have  to invest large sums  in 
technical equipment,  particularly for  long production runs. 
3  Which  can be  used  for  one  type  of aircraft only. 
283 and  testing equipment  and  a  very  large, 
skilled labour  force  are required.  This  indicates the  pattern of 
investment  for  firms  making  airframes.  Buildings and  land,  special 
machinery and plant and  test equipment  will be  heavy  items.  Special 
tools are  not  generally included among  investments  on  the assets 
side of the balance  sheet  because,  as will be  seen,  they are written 
off directly against orders. 
Lastly,  the  fact  that assembly  cannot  be  automated  and  the  need 
for heavy  deliveries over relatively short periods  involve  heavy 
costs before processing  (storage  of  components),  on  the  production 
line and after production  (testing stage).  When  one  considers  the 
cost of components,  semi-finished products  and  finished  items in 
this industry,  it is not  difficult to appreciate  how  much  capital 
is tied up  in these  items,  which in some  American  firms  together 
account  for  one-third to half of the  total assets  on  the  balance 
sheet. 
From  the  form  which processing takes,  as already briefly mentioned, 
it may  be  concluded that productivity in  the  aeronautical industry 
can  only be  increased by  improving  the  organization of production 
as a  whole,  because  stages  or  whole  processing  cycles  cannot  be 
automated,  as  they  can  in other engineering industries. 
This is confirmed  by  examination  of the  structure  of American aero-
space  firms1,  among  which  airframe  constructors are  increasingly 
adopting a  new  strategy and  a  special  form  of organization. 
The  new  strategy can be  defined as  the  gradual abandonment  of the 
production of individual components  and  subsystems  and  the  increasing 
adoption of  the  role  of integrator and  manager  of the  system. 
1  See  Annex  7:  "Survey of the  American  Aerospace  Industry". 
284 Provided efficient means  of systems  management  and monitoring are 
available, it is possible  by'dividing the  work  between large  num-
bers of contractors and sub-contractors: 
-to spread  R&D  and production risks over a  number  of firms; 
- to make  substantial savings  on special tools and products by 
specialization of  the  various  firms,  while at the  same  time 
reducing outlay on  machines  and  fixed plant and  increasing their 
work ratio; 
- to cut  down  overall production times. 
With this arrangement,  the  firm  in charge  of the  programme  also 
tends  to specialize and  to  introduce an appropriate pattern of 
production and  organization. 
Factories are planned  on  the  basis of assembly  of the  large sub-
systems  and  the  complete  system of a  single aircraft programme  so 
that the  factory  becomes  identified with the  programme. 
As  regards organization,  responsibility for  R&D,  production and 
sales under  a  given  programme  is given  to  a  division or  one  of ita 
branches. 
1  2.3 Production Costs 
2.3.1  Classification of costs 
Aircraft production  costs  can be  classified as  follows: 
Variable  costs:  Direct labour 
~ 
Raw  materials 
The  material  which  follows  is taken  from:  "Cost  curves  and pr1c1ng 
in aircraft production"  by S.G.  Sturney in the  Economic  Journal, 
December  1964,  and  from  "The  learning curve  and its application to 
the aircraft industry" by  K.  Hartley in the  Journal of Industrial 
Economics,  March  1965. 
285 Parts and  components 
Variable  production  charges 
Fixed  coats:  Fixed production  charges 
Overheads 
Launching  costs
1
:  Research and  development 
Jigs and  tools 
Sales and  promotion  coats 
Learning  costs 
We  shall now  briefly review  the  main  cost  items  in an attempt to 
highlight certain features  and  the  main  problems  of aircraft 
production. 
2.3.2 Direct  labour and  the  learning curve 
In the aircraft industry,  the  incidence  of direct labour costs 
on  production is defined  by  the  so-called "learning curve". 
This  was  devised  by T.P.  Wright  from  empirical data in 1936  and 
can  be  illustrated graphically as  follows: 
80%  learning curve 
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Total number  of aircraft produced 
Source:  K.  Hartley Op.Cit. 
1  Launching  costs as  defined in English. 
286 According to Wright,  therefore,  when  the  total  number  of units 
produced  doubles,  the  average  input  of  hours  of direct  labour 
drops  to  about  80%  of the  average  input  per unit prior to  the 
doubling of production.  This  reduction applies  to all units pro-
duced.  Wright's  curve  is known  as  a  cumulative  mean  learning 
curve. 
Next,  a  (marginal)  curve  (Fig.  5)  was  worked  out  to  express  the 
reduction,  in terms  of a  constant  factor1,  of the  input  of direct 
labour per unit  produced,  each  time  that  the  number  of units pro-
duced is doubled. 
Despite  the  fact that learning factors  may  vary  f=um  case  to  case, 
o.B  can  be  taken as  a  representative average  for the  trend of di-
rect labour hours  per unit produced. 
The  shape  of the  curve  shows  a  marked  drop  in direct labour hours 
per unit produced during the first stages of production  (up  to the 
fortiet·h unit);  the  curve  then tends  to  flatten,  indicating that 
direct labour input per unit produced tends  to  become  constant. 
2.3.3 Raw  materials,  parts and  components 
It may  be  postulated that the  cost of raw materials per unit pro-
duced  tends  to  decrease at the earliest stages of production;  once 
the  cycle has  been  standardized,  and  excess  losses and  waste  have 
therefore  been  cut  out,  this cost will tend  to  become  constant  for 
each unit produced. 
Components  comprise  the  engine,  electronic and  other equipment, 
landing gear,  wheels  and all other parts produced  by  specialist 
1 
Learning factor:  three  different learning factors  (0.9,  o.B 
and 0.7)  are  considered in Fig.  1 
287 fiG.  5  Marginal Learning  Curve 
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first unit  produced. 
Source  : S.G.  Sl'JRMEY  OP.  Cl T. 
288 firms.  The  cost  of  components  for  an aircraft is constant  for  each 
unit  produced if the  number  in the  series  to  be  constructed is 
1 
known  at the  outset  • 
Allowing  for  the  fact  that  the  maker  of  components  also has 
launching and  learning costs,  which  have  to  be  covered  by  a  given 
number  of units
2
,  the  price is fixed  by  reference  to  the  antic-
ipated demand  for aircraft equipped with the  required  components, 
plus  the  possible  demand  for  spares. 
Since  the  maker  of the aircraft buys at this price,  the  cost of 
components  per unit  produced will remain  constant if sales fore-
casts are  fulfilled or  prove  too  high  (in which  case  the  maker  of 
components  will lose  to  the extent that he  fails to  cover  launching 
costs). 
On  the  other hand,  if sales exceed  forecasts: 
- the  price  of  components  may  be  reduced  for units produced 
in excess  of the  number  originally planned  (this is normally 
the  case  in Europe); 
the  price  may  remain  constant if the  contractor is associated 
with the  R&D  risk;  in this case  (frequent  in the  USA)  the in-
creased profit will  go  to the  component  manufacturer. 
2.3.4 Launching  costs 
The  biggest- items  in launching  costs are research and  development 
and  special tooling  (jigs,  etc.). 
Promotion,  sales and  learning costs are  smaller  items.  These  have 
already  been  mentioned  under  direct costs,  with  which  they are 
included  (in the  learning curve). 
1 
and  thus  before  orders are  placed with contractors. 
2 
the price per unit will clearly be  higher for  small runs. 
289 As  regards  promotion and  sales costs,  it should  be  noted that 
when  production is started before  any  firm  orders  have  been 
placed,  the  manufacturing  company  normally  charges special prices 
to the  buyer  who  takes  over the risk of introducing a  new  aircraft 
on  the  market.  The  difference  between  the  "normal" price and this 
(lower)  "special" price  charged  for  the  first units  made  forms  an 
item  in launching costs.  Promotion  and  development  costs account 
for  a  large part of launching costs,  particularly at the  moment: 
their special feature  is that they  have  to  be  covered before pro-
duction is launched and  that their level is not affected in the 
slightest by  the  number  of units  produced. 
This  second aspect  does  not necessarily apply to specific tools, 
which are,  however,  a  priority charge,  in the  same  way  as  R&D. 
In designing his tools,  the  manufacturer  has  a  very  wide  range  of 
choices,  governed basically by  the  length of  the  run to be  pro-
duced,  the  work  load at factories  and  the  cost  of  labour. 
When  the production  run is short and  wages  are relatively low, 
the preference will go  to  simple  jigs and  dies, ·which are  made  by 
hand,  are  cheap  and  do  not  last long. 
In such cases,  the  cost  of drawings  will also be  cut  because 
full details of all the  assemblies  are  not  required. 
If the  run is longer,  detail drawings are  needed  for all (or most) 
items  of  the airframe  and  the  corresponding tools;  more  use  will 
have  to  be  made  of machine  tools to produce  dies,  jigs and  tools, 
involving high direct and  indirect costs ttooling of machine  tools). 
One  option to  some  extent  excludes  the  other and  the  consequences 
of a  mistake  can be  very serious.  If poor  tools are  chosen it may 
1  not  be  possible to  meet  an unexpected  demand  •  In the  opposite 
1  Tools,  and  more  particularly assembly  tools,  are  a  real bottle-
neck in the  production  cycle,  because  they  prevent  output  from  ex-
ceeding  the rate  for  which  they  were  planned  (this point is further 
discussed in Section 2.4 below). 
290 case  of large numbers  of special tools and  demand  less than ex-
pected,  inability to pay off capital investment will mean  a 
substantial loss. 
2.4 Trend of Coste in Relation to Volume  and Rate  of Production 
In the study to which reference has  been made,  s.G.  Sturmey 
reconstructs the  cost  components  for a  "standard" aircraft and 
makes  a  calculation for  the  break-even unit, i.e., the  conditions 
in which  for unit n  and unit price p,  np  is by definition equal to 
total costs. 
It is assumed  that: 
a)  - launching costs =  20 p; 
- average unit  launching cost  for unit n  =  0.2 
b)  - overheads =  300%  of direct costs  (excluding  components) 
- the ratio of direct labour to materials  (including components) 
and  overheads is 1  :  4  :  5 
c)  Total overheads are  made  up  as  follows: 
- fixed overhea4s =  20%  of the total;  the ratio of fixed and 
variable production charges is 2  :  1. 
On  the assumption that for unit n  total costs are equal to p  and 
that average unit launching cost is 0.2, it follows  that average 
production costs will be  0.8 p. 
The  breakdown  of cost  items at the  break-even point is,  therefore, 
as  follows: 
Direct  labour 
Raw  materials 
o.oB  p 
0.05  p 
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Direct costs  0.13 p Components  0.27  p 
Variable  on  costs  0.10 p 
Variable  costs  0.50 p 
Fixed on  costs  0.22  p 
Overheads  o.o8  p 
Production· costs  o.Bo  p 
Launching  costs  0.20 p  Total cost  p 
The  number  of aircraft n  to be  produced is also determined by 
the  foregoing. 
If: 
- total costs =  np 
total launching costs = 20  p 
- average unit launching cost  =  0.2 p 
The11: 
n  must  be  100 
By  applying an 80%  learning curve  for  direct labour to this unitary 
relation,  S.G.  Sturmey  was  able  to  compile  the  following table, 
which assumes  that the  break-even point is reached  with the  hun-
dreth unit: 
292 Number  Direct Materials ~ariable  Estab- Over- Prod-}aunching  Total 
of  labour parts and on-costs  lish- heads uction  costs  costs 
units  cost  components  ment  costs 
produced  costa 
1 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
90 
100 
200 
2.43  3.2  1.0  6.63  3.0  9.63  200.00  209.63 
1.54  3.2  1.0  5.74  3.0  8.74  20.00  28.74 
1.28  3.2  1.0  5.48  3.0  8.48  10.00  18.48 
1.15  3.2  1.0  5.35  3,.0  8.35  6.66  15.01 
1.05  3.2  1.0  5.25  3.0  8.25  5.00  13.25 
0.98  3.2  1.0  5.18  3.0  8.18  4.00  12.18 
0.93  3.2  1.0  5.13  3.0  8.13  3.33  11.46 
o.89  3.2  1.0  5.09  3.0  8.09  2.86  10.95 
o.85  3.2  1.0  5.05  3.0  8.05  2.50  10.55 
0.82  3.2  1.0  5.02  3.0  8.02  2.22  10.24 
o.Bo  3.2  1.0  5.00  3.00  8.oo  2.00  10.00 
o.65  3.2  1.0  4.85  3.00  7.85  1.00  8.85 
It will be  seen that: 
- the  difference in average  production cost  between  the  thirtieth 
and  the hundredth unit is 4.2%;  the  drop  in total cost  due  to this 
factor is about  2%f 
-total costs fall by  33%  from  the  thirtieth to thehuniredth unit 
produced  because  of the  reduced  incidence  of launching costs. 
This  clearly demonstrates  that the critical factor in any aircraft 
programme  is to  be  found  in lau&ching  costs. 
293 The  overall pattern of costs  shows  that action to support production 
has its maximum  effect  (by lowering the  break-even point) if it 
brings  down  launchiag costs1• 
While  the  length of the  production run is unquestionably the  most 
important variable,  the rate of production,  which has so far been 
assumed  to be  constant,  can play a  very significant part in some 
cases. 
Short runs rule  out  high rates of production because  they do  not 
2  justify costly tooling  :  instead,  the  maximum  savings  on production 
are usually achieved when  rates are not  high. 
The  balance  can however,  be  upset  by  two  different factors: 
- the market  may  require higher rates than planned:  in this case, 
once  the saturation point of the available equipment  has been 
exceeded  (particularly in the  case of assembly  jigs), it will 
become  necessary to make  new  tools which  cannot  easily be  covered 
by  a  short runf 
- demand  may  be higher than anticipated;  in these  circumstances, 
1 
even with a  low rate of production,  the  situation already described 
may  be  repeated with the  variant that  new  dies and tools will have 
to be  made  for  machine  tools rather than  new  assembly tools. 
In the  case  quoted,  a  grant amounting to 50%  of launching costs 
would  lower  the  break-even point  from  100 to 54  units. 
2  See 5ection 2.3.4 above. 
294 On  the other hand,  a  long run allows high rates of production, 
because of the  large  number  of tools available  which  can  be  pald 
off over the  number  of aircraft to  be  produced. 
Such rates can  be  handled  economically  by  a  large manufacturer,  who 
can use  his fixed plant at full load to make  parts and sub-assemblies 
and  can use various assembly  jigs. 
A small manufacturer seeking to  compete  for  the  long runs at high 
production rates would,  however,  be  in difficulty:  he  would  be 
unable  to increase his fixed plant,  unless  he  hoped to recoup his 
capital outlay over subsequent  runs  making  other types of aircraft. 
If he  ~~cides against this and increases his stock of special tools, 
this item will cost more  and his production costs will be  higher 
than those of a  firm  tooled  from  the outset for  long production runs. 
The  points so far discussed mark  one  of the basic differences between 
the  American and European industries. 
Long  runs are  ,  of course,  very  frequent  in the United States,  for 
both military and civil aircraft;  moreover,  American  runs are longer 
1  than those  experienced in Europe  • 
1  The  Plowden  Report  estimated that: 
- production runs  for  American military aircraft brought  into 
service between 1955  and  1961  amounted to 530  units as against 
177  for  the  United Kingdom  (ratio 3  :  1); 
- the  corresponding figures  for  commercial aircraft were  320  for 
the  USA  and  68  for  the United Kingdom  (ratio 4.5  :  1). 
A similar calculation for Europe,  covering only the  main  types 
brought  into service since 1955,  gives the  following results: 
-military aircraft:  average  American run= 1,409 against  409 
for Europe  (ratio 3  :  1); 
- commercial aircraft:  average  American run  492  against 138  for 
Europe  (ratio 3.5  :  1). 
295 On  the basis of our  foregoing remarks,  it may  be  stated that the 
American industry is tooled and scaled for  long aircraft production 
runs at lower  cost and at higher rates than its European  counter-
parts. 
Figs.  6  and 7  illustrate this last point and  show  clearly how  the 
American industry succeeds  in constructing large  numbers  of air-
craft during the  first  two  or three  years of production. 
With this productive  capacity,  American  firms are able to fulfil 
orders very  quickly  (Figs.  8  and  9)  and to deliver at almost  the 
same  rate as orders are obtained. 
1  As  already stated  ,  the  shortest of the  time  between  the first 
flight and the first delivery often enable  American  firms  to  catch 
up  the lead initially enjoyed by European  firms;  their ability to 
produce  large  numbers  of tools rapidly in turn enables  them to 
fulfil orders  from  airlines very quickly.  Clearly,  this last point 
will weigh  heavily when  airline  companies  are  making  a  choice2 
because  their market  is on.  such a  scale and so  competitive that they 
cannot delay bringing new  aircraft into service as  they have  to 
keep  up  with their competitors. 
Since  only  the  main  programmes  are  taken into consideration,  the 
average  run is naturally higher than  the  figure  given in the Plowden 
report.  However,  for military aircraft the  USA/Europe  ratio is the 
same  as  the  figure  in the. Plowden report;  for  commercial  types,  the 
ratio is more  favourable  to  Europe  because  a  number  of non-British 
projects  (Caravella,  etc.) are  included. 
1  See·Section 2.2. 
2  The  same  argument  can  be  used in the  case  of military aircraft, 
but  for different reasons. 
296 FIG.  G 
Number 
1 
Deliveries of  Long-H~.:L:ge TurbgjllA_ 
(Year  of first delivery =  0) 
B 707 
2  3  4  5  6  7  9  10 
USA 
EUROPE. 
297 
Year FIG.  7  Deliveries of Medium/Short  Range  Turbojets 
(YJear  of  f.ii.rst  deli  ve:r:y  =  0) 
,, 
1\, 
DC  9 
I  ' 
I  \  '---
I  ' 
I  \  ', 
\  ' 
B7V 
\  --- ......  \  BAC  til  ...... _- -· CARAVEllE 
a-.  .... .,. ~ 
/'  ..... -....---, 
/  ' 
/  '  '  TRIDP~T 
1  2  4  5  6  1  8  9 
us 
EURCPE 
298 
10  Year FIG, 8  Orders  an~ Deliveries:  Amer.ican  and EFFOpean  Long-Range  Turbojets 
(U~  •  DC_£,  8  7C'·7,  B 7?0,  B 747,  CV  P~~0/990;  £UROP~· CGME,T,  VC  10) 
Number 
280 
260 
240 
220 
180 
160 
140 
120 
100 
80 
60 
40 
20 
1957  1958  1959  1960  19&1  19&2  1963  1964  1965  Year 
us  :  EUROPl: 
-
Orders  ---- Orders 
Deliveries  Deliveries 
299 FIG.  9  Orders  and Deliveries:  American  and European Medium/Short  Range  Turbojets 
(US:  B TZ'I,  f.l?~?,  OC  9;  El'~C:P£ •  f<AC  Ill,_  1RI£•f:~T,  C:_~AVfllf F  ?JI 
Number 
480 
460 
440 
420 
400 
380 
360 
~0 
320 
Orders 
300  us 
Deliveries 
280 
260 
240  l
---- Orders 
EUROPE  -----
Deliveries 
220 
180 
160 
140 
120 
100 
eo 
60 
40 
20 
, 
~"'  ,'/  .......  ___  ,  I 
/  I 
~  I 
,  I 
0+-------~----r---~---r--~----~--~--~----r---~---r---
1957  1958  1959  1960  1%1  1962  1%3  1%4  1<J&5  1~•&6  1967  Year 
300 3.  CHANGES  IN  AERONAUTICAL  AND  SPACE  FIRNS 
3.1  Concentration of Firms 
1  It has  already been  stated  that  only a  big undertaking is capable 
of producing long runs  economically and at the  same  time  of main-
taining a  high delivery rate. 
Turning to the  financial aspects,  it must  now  be  noted that, 
because  of the  length of the planning/production  cycle and the 
actual  form  of the  production process,  aerospace  firms  require a 
large amount  of capital2  to  finance: 
- productive investments; 
- research and  development; 
- production; 
- leasing and  customer credit. 
Clearly,  a  big undertaking will find it easier than a  small one  to 
obtain the  funds it requires  from  the  capital market,  and will also 
be  in a  stronger position to deal with  government  departments because 
of its greater contracting resources. 
Another factor  which  favours  the  big firm  derives  indirectly from 
the diversification of the activities of aeronautical  companies. 
Anticipating a  fuller treatment  of this point(,  it may  be  said that 
this diversification has  either been stimulated by  the  goyernment 
(missiles and  space  programmes)  or has  been undertaken deliberately 
1  See Section 2.4. 
2  As  well as a  big labour  force  and  a  high input  of materials. 
3  See Section 3.3 below. 
301 by  firms  who  have  channelled investments  to the  commercial air-
craft sector and  marginally  towards  other minor  sectors,  to escape 
from  the  dangerously  rigid position of having the State as their 
sole customer. 
The  fact that minimum  optimum  levels,  to which  reference  has 
already been made,  apply to the  new  branches  of activity also,  has 
necessarily militated in favour  of bigger dimensions. 
The  trend towards  big undertakings is a  fact,  and is fully  justi-
fied·by  ~he foregoing  remarks. 
However,  the  existence  or absence  of the  conditions calling for 
large  firms  may  alter the pattern so  far described. 
Thus,  for  example,  a  public  company  may  have  no  problems as 
regards  finance  (assuming that its programmes  are  sound  or of 
interest to the State)  or may  have  no  interest in diversifying 
(the  government  may,  on  the  contrary,  insist on  specialization). 
Similar circumstances  may  arise in countries  where  the  central 
government  intervenes  otherwise  than  by  providing capital but 
with similar effects so  far as  firms  are  concerned. 
This  may  well explain the  size of many  European undertakings, 
which,  as will be  seen,  are  much  smaller than their American 
counterparts. 
The  only condition which  can hardly be  challenged is the  first 
one  set out at the  beginning of this section,  namely,  that only 
a  big firm is capable  of producing long aircraft runs  economically 
and rapidly.  Since it is not necessarily true,  at least on  a  ~riori 
grounds,  that the market  for  the  European aerospace  industry must 
be  confined to Europe,  and assuming  therefore  a  world  market  and 
the possibility of long production runs,  European  firms  must, 
other things being equal,  be  big enough to meet  international 
competition successfully. 
302 Taking  iLto account  the  varying conditions of the  markets in which 
the  main aerospace  firms  in the  EEC  countries,  the United Kingdom 
and the United States have  to operate,  we  shall now  make  a  brief 
1  survey of trends  over  the  last  few  years  • 
In the United States,  if we  exclude  the  merger of the  McDonnell 
2  and  Douglas  companies  ,  the  present size of the  main  aerospace 
firms  has  been arrived at  more  by  autonomous  development  than by 
a  process  of concentration. 
Three  main  factors  have  contributed to the  growth  of American 
companies,  which  were  in fact already of  some  considerable size 
by  the  end  of  the  fifties. 
While  space  programmes  have  not  overall,  i.e.,  so  far as  the 
industry is concerned,  contributed greatly to increasing total 
output  (owing  to  the  falling off of demand  for  military aircraft), 
they have  concentrated orders  on  a  few  firms  and  in particular on 
those  which  were  already  "big"  by  the  end  of the fifties. 
The  new  contracting policy,  first,  of  NASA  and  then of the  DoD, 
have  considerably restricted the  government's  previous policy of 
providing factories,  plant and  machinery  to  be  used  free  of charge 
or virtually so,  and has  obliged  companies  to invest large  sums  in 
technical  equipment  and  premises  to  meet  the  revived public  demand. 
1 
2 
This point is dealt  with in greater detail for  each  country in 
the  "National Reports"  and  in Annex  2:  "Survey of  the  American 
Aerospace  Industry". 
Brought about  by  Douglas'  need  for  substantial amounts  of capital 
to  finance  tooling,  R&D  and  production to meet  orders obtained 
or under negotiation,  and  probably by  HoDonnell's interest in 
diversifying on  the  demand  side. 
303 From  1964  onwards,  the  expansion of commercial aviation has 
called for heavy  investment  in technical equipment  and large 
.amounts  of capital to  finance  production. 
Consequently,  there have  been other mergers  of aerospace under-
takings,  such as the  absorption of Republic  and Hiller by Fairchild, 
the  concentration of Sikorsky and Pratt and  Whitney into United 
Aircraft,  etc.,  as well as  others between aerospace and outside 
firms,  such as  the  merger  between North  American  Aviation and 
Rockwell,  which is perhaps  the  most  important  of all. 
Indeed,  at a  given size of undertaking,  changes in the  pattern of 
the aeronautical and  space  market  would  appear  to  have  led the 
company  concerned  to  merge  with undertakings  from  other branches 
and/or to purchase  them. 
The  tatle below  may  be  helpful as a  guide  to  what  has  been 
happening: 
Concentration of American  Aerospace Firms  by Branches of Activity 
{1955-63)  (percentages) 
Total turnover  Branch of activity of  firm  taken over 
of aerospace 
firm  taking  Aero- Elec- Production  Chemicals  Instru- Other  Total 
over  {$M)  apace  tron- of metals  menta 
ice  and  machin-
ery 
200  10  30  10  22  13  15  100 
50-200  12  21  35  6  - 26  100 
50  37  1·5  34  - - 14  100 
Source:  Federal Trade  Commission  and National Industrial Conference Board. 
304 Between  1955  and 1963  the biggest  American aerospace  companies, 
notably those  with a  turnover  of  over  $200 million,  mainly  took 
over  firma  working in the  most  advanced  branches  of industry,  such 
as electronics,  chemicals and  instruments. 
The  reason for this trend may  be  the  growth  of  space  programmes 
which,  over the  las~ few  years,  have  been  increasing the  demand 
J  ' 
for  work  on  electronics,  power plants,  instruments and  other 
extremely  complex  and sophisticated sub-systems,  while activity 
in the aircraft branch proper  (airframe~has been  falling off 
relatively. 
The  steadily growing  importance  of aerospace  firma  in the  field of 
the  most  advanced technologies  may  easily be  deduced  from  the  fore-
going. 
Medium-sized  firms  (with  a  turnover  from  $50  million to $200 million) 
have  to a  greater extent  taken over undertakings  engaged  in the 
production of metals  and  the  construction of machinery. 
This is indicative of the  trend towards diversification  (outside 
the aeronautical industry),  but in branches  of industry which are 
less advanced  technologically. 
The  smallest  firms  (turnover below $50 million)  have,  on  the other 
hand,  taken over a  greater number  (37~)  of companies already working 
in the  aerospace sector. 
These last are generally  firms  engaged  on  the  supply of components 
and  the  production of parts of aerospace  systems,  rather than on  the 
planning and manufacture  of finished products.  With their limited 
scientific and  technical management  capacity,  such  firms  are natu-
rally less interested in taking over companies  from  advanced  tech-
nological branches. 
Around  1960,  the  example  of large  American  firms,  on  the  one  hand, 
and  the  excessive  fragmentation of British companies,  on  the  other, 
305 led the British Government  to promote  the  concentration of firms 
in the United Kingdom,  through ita position as a  source of contracts. 
The  aim of this move  was  to reduce  the  excessive  fragmentation of 
investments  and  research expenditure  and  to  enable the British 
industry to  compete  at international level. 
The  initial result  (Fig.  10)  was  the  formation of two  groups  each 
in the airframesand engine  branches  and  one  for helicopters. 
The  subsequent  concentration of the  two  engine undertakings re-
sulted in the  formation of  a  company  bigger
1  than the  engine 
divisions  of the  equivalent  American  companies.  There are still 
two  airframe  companies,  however,  even  though the  government  has 
come  out  in favour  of their merger  into a  single undertaking.  This 
has  so  far  been  prevented by  the state of the  economy. 
The  aerospace  industry of the European  Community  is characterized 
by  the  fact  that  firms  are  small and,  in some  cases,  very small. 
The  French and German  governments  have  encouraged  concentration 
and  mergers at national level. 
In France,  the  main  form  of government  action has  been the national-
2  ization of a  number  of companies,. 
Up  till 1966,  private undertakings  were  not  involved in the process 
of concentration  which in any  case  was  not  on  a  large  sca1e3•  In 
1967,  when  the  government  declared its policy on  the  reorganization 
of the aerospace  industry,  the  private  company  Dassault took over 
another private  company,  Breguet,  and  the nationalized undertaking, 
1  Employing  about  80,000  men. 
2  Namely,  the  formation  of Sud-Aviation  (1957),  Nord··Aviation  (1946) 
and  SNECMA  (1945). 
3  Absorption  of a  number  of subsidiaries and  small  firms  (Morane-
Saulnier,  Air Fouga,  Potez). 
306 t:fG.  10  United Kingdom  - Concentration in the  Aerospace  Industry 
(1958-68) 
1958 
Airframes 
Ha~~cr Slddeley 1 
Follanc! 
de  r.avUland 
Bristol  t.ircraft. 
[nglish Eltctric Aviation 
Vlcker~-~rm&trong 
Hunting J.lrc•·a:n. 
\:estland 
Bristol  ~elicopter Division 
Fairey 
Savnders-t(oe 
A.vster 
V.ilt& 
ltandlet  r<~sc 
Scottish Aviation 
Short B!'os 
Engines 
Bristol  Aero  Engines 
Arcstrong Siddeley 
de  t:avllland  Engines 
Blackburn  fngine  Co 
Rol 1  s-~o  yc e 
l 
l 
Naplrr  ~ So.t  (subsidiary 
of English Eledrlc) 
l.lvls 
19GO 
British Aircraft c,rporatlon 
Westland  Aircraft lto 
De~gle 
Handley Page 
Scottish lviation 
Short  Bros 
Cristo)  Siddel~y En~:nes 
Roll s-11oyc-: 
Na~ter Aero  f~3incs 
(50~ Roll~~<oyce) 
Alvis 
19G8 
Haw'.cer  SJddeley 
British Aircraft Corporation 
Westland Aircraft ltd 
Beagle 
Handley  Page 
Scottish Aviation 
Short Bros 
Rolls-Royce 
Alvis 
In 1960,  Hawker  Siddeley had  the  following subsidiaries: 
I 
Ara:.lrong  I 
Gloster 
\lhltwor th 
.. IR  ,. • ..,.  oe 
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Armstrc~g Siddr-
ley £:1gi.H!So SNECMA,  took over the  engine  division of Hispano Suiza. 
The  two  nationalized undertakings  (Nord-and Sud-Aviation)  and the 
research  company  SEREB  are  due  to merge  in 1970. 
1  In Germany,  the first mergers  date  from  1963,  when  the  conditions 
for starting a  process  which is still continuing,were  created 
(government policy,  firms  brought  together in consortia). 
The  decision to merge  with Messerschmitt-Bolkow GmbH  was  taken by 
the  family  company  of HFB  in 1969. 
In the Netherlands,  there is only one  firm  working  on airframes. 
This is Fokker,  which has  in turn taken  over Avio  Diepen and  the 
aircraft interests of De  Schelde  (1954)  and  Aviolanda  (1967). 
In Belgium,  three  firms  employ  90%  of the  labour  force  of the 
national aerospace  industry:  Sabca and Fairey in the airframes 
branch and  the  Fabrique  Nationale  d'Armes  de  Guerre  SA  in the 
engine branch.  Th~ fact  that some  of the  capital of the  two  air-
frame  firms is held by non-nationals probably accounts  for the 
failure to merge. 
1  The  main  mergers  can  be  shown  diagrammatically as  follows: 
Bolkow  Entwicklungen  KG  } 
(including Bolkow  Apparatebau)  Bolkow  GmbH  l 
Siebelwerke  ATG  GmbH  Messerschmitt 
Bolkow  GmbH 
Messerschmitt  AG  J  Messerschmitt- J( 1968) 
Junkers Flugzeug- und  Werke 
Motorenwerke  AG  Flugzeug Union  Sud 
Flugzeug Union Sttd  GmbH  GmbH 
Weser  Flugzeugbau GmbH  J 
Focke-Wulf GmbH 
ErnstHeinkel Flugzeugbau.GmbH 
BMW  Triebwerkbau  GmbH  } 
MAN  Turbomotoren  GmbH 
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Vereinigte Flug-
technische  Werke 
GmbH  (VFW) 
MAN  Turbo  GmbH Similarl~ in Italy there  have  been  no  moves  to  concentrate aero-
space  undertakings,  but  for  different reasons. 
Overall,  however,  there  has  been a  decisive  move  in Europe  to con-
centrate aerospace  firms  at national and  EEC  level.  In this  con-
nection,  reference  should  be  made  to a  number  of recent  st-eps 
(1968-69)  aimed at setting up  multinational  companies1  within 
the  EEC. 
For example,  Fokker  (Netherlands)  and  Dassault  (France)  have  ac-
quired equal shares  in the  capital of the  Belgian company  SABCA, 
while  Fokker  (Netherlands)  and  VFW  (Germany)2  have  formed  (in 1969) 
a  holding  company  under  the  name  of "Zentralgesellschaft VFI/Fokker 
GmbH". 
Nevertheless,  even allowing for  the special conditions  in which 
they operate,  EEC  firms  and British companies  (with the  exception 
of Rolls  Royce)  do  not  yet appear to have  achieved the necessary 
size to  ensure sufficient financial,  productive and  organizational 
resources  to  enable  them  to  compete  independently  on  the  interna-
tional market. 
Moreover,  both governments  and private operators appear to be  well 
aware  of these limits,  as is confirmed  by  recent  moves  at both 
national and  international level. 
In the table  on  the next  page  (Fig.  11),  the  five  leading American 
'firms are  compared  with,  respectively,  the  five  biggest in the  EEC 
1  Which  involve  legal problems in the absence  of adequate 
Community  legislation. 
2  They  had already been  working  together for  some  time  on 
R&D  and production.  • 
309 FIG.  11  Labour Force and Value Figures for the Main  Firma Operating in 1969  in the EEC, 
the United Kingdom  and the United States1 
Labour  force  Output 
Percen- Value  Perc  en-
~housands  tage  ~ill  ions  tage 
of dollare 
EEC  Countries 
Whole  industrl  1t_1,  100,0  1,758  100.0 
of which: 
SUO-AVIATION- NORD-AVIAT 100  - 5EREB 2  '57  "22,6  509  28,9 
OASSAULT  13  7,9  279  15.9 
SNECMA  13  7,9  213  12,1 
MESSERSCHMITT  - BOLKOW- HFB  19  11.6  164  9.3 
VtW- FOKKER  16  9,7  146  8.3 
-- -- -- -- Total for five  firms  98  59,7  1,311  74,5 
-- -- -- --
United Kingdom 
Whole  industry  254  100,0  1,610  100.0  =  = 
ROLLS-ROYCE  73  28,7  605  37.6 
B A C  37  14.6  439  27,2 
HAWKER  SIDDELEY  48  18,9  364  22,6 
-- -- -- -- Total for three  firms  158  62.2  1,408  87,4 
-- -- -- = 
United States 
Whole  industry  1,168  100.0  23,25~  100.0 
MC  DONNELL  DOUGLAS  140  12.0  2,933  12,6 
BOEING  142  12.1  2,8so  12,4 
NORTH  AMERICAN  ROCKWELL  115  9,8  2,438  10.5 
LOCKHEED  92  7.9  2,335  10~0 
GENERAL  OYN~~ICS  103  8,8  2,253  9,7 
-- -- -- -- !otal for  five  firms  ·s92  50,6  12)839  55,2 
-- -- --
The  labour force  and  output  value  figures relate to 1967. 
2  In  '! :'"0. 
310 and  the  three  biggest  in the  United  Kingdom  (classified on  the 
basis of turnover). 
It will be  seen that the  le~ding EEC  undertakings account  for  a 
bigger percentage  of  both production and  employment  in the  Com-
munity aerospace  industry than  do  the  main  American  firms  within 
their industry. 
On  the  other hand  - and this is the  crux of the  problem  - each of 
the  leading American  firms  separately produces  one  and  a  half times 
as  much  as the  whole  EEC  industry,  with a  smaller labour force. 
The  process of concentration which  has  been started and largely 
carried through in Europe  must  now  be  considered  from  other angles. 
Some  doubts  may  be  felt  concerning the  formation,  at national level, 
of a  single undertaking with a  monopoly  of one  branch  (airframes or 
engines)  of the aerospace  industry. 
Indeed,  in some  European  countries voices of authority have  express-
ed  concern at the  possible absence  of healthy competition. 
Far  from  disputing the  soundness  of this attitude,  we  shall here 
confine  ourselves  to pointing out  that  the  geographical area within 
which  the aeronautical industry operates and effective competition 
exists goes  far  beyond  the  confines of a  single  country. 
The  United States,  which  escape  this competition in some  measure, 
are  the real proof to  the  contrary. 
As  is well known,  the  principal reason for the underdevelopment  of 
the  European aerospace  industries is the  narrowness  of  thei~ na-
tional markets.  Furthermore,  programmes1  calling for a  great deal 
in the  way  of technology or the  production of a  long run have  had 
to be  undertaken  jointly by  the industries of several European 
countries. 
1  Aircraft,  missiles and space  programmes. 
311 It has already been  shown,  therefore,  that markets  of adequate 
size very often have  to be  sought  beyond  the  national frontiers 
so that,  in this case also,  several European  industries have  to 
work together to deal with  the  problem.  Hence,  competition is 
not very active within the  EEC  or at European level. 
While  the European market  may  to  some  extent,  and  for  a  limited 
period,  be sufficient for military aircraft,  missiles and  space 
work,  the  same  cannot  be  said of  commercial aviation.  In the latter 
case,  the  market  and  competition are  worldwide. 
The  contrast between the  leading American  firms  taken separately 
and the  EEC  aerospace  industry as a  whole  is now  very clear. It 
thus seems  to us  that the  characteristics of the aircraft, missile 
and  space  market  do  not  merely prove  that anxiety  concerning na-
tional monopolies  is ill-founded but call rather for  further  con-
centration on a  supranational basis. 
1  While  this is unlikely at the  moment  ,  for  a  wide  variety of rea-
sons,  there  can,  however,  be  no  doubt  that  the  concentration on 
aeronautical interests at national level may  ultimately  favour 
this process and,  in more  immediate  and  concrete  terms,  cooperation 
between the  industries of the  Community  countries and  more  gener-
ally the  countries of Europe,  at either government  or  company  level. 
In Europe,  the  concentration of firms  has  led to  the  formation  of 
groups  of considerable size with substantial economic  resources2• 
In  the  form it has  taken,  this concentration should theoretically 
enable  the  firms  concerned  to deal,  at least partially and better 
1  Even  though  the  Fokker/VFW  agreement is a  by  no  means 
insignificant pointer. 
2  Within  the limits stated earlier. 
312 than before,  with  two  of the  problems  enumerated earlier;  they 
should be  better able  to  obtain the necessary oapttal and to win 
contracts. 
On  the  other hand,  the  problem of gearing the pattern of production 
to the  new  scale  of  the  firm  would  appear  to remain unresolved. 
In practice,  mergers  have  not  as a  rule been  concerned with reor-
ganizing and replanning the existing production units. This is 
confirmed by  looking at the  large  numbers  of factories operated 
1  by  each  new  undertaking  ;  these are  generally widely scattered 
over the  country  concerned,  are often very  small and are still 
managed after quite  some  time  by  the  companies  included in the 
merger. 
All this naturally militates against the  rational and  economic 
organization of production and,  more  generally,  of the  firm itself. 
It may  be  concluded that the  disadvantages of not  having achieved 
the requisite size are  further aggravated  by  the  fact that  expan-
sion to the existing size has  not as a  rule been accompanied  by 
reorganization of the  production process and of the  undertaking 
as a  whole. 
1  See  "National Reports". 
313 3.2 The  Financial Structure of  Aerospace  Firms 
3.2.1  Foreword 
This analysis of the  financial structure of aerospace  firms  in 
the  EEC  countries,  the  United Kingdom  and  the United States suffers 
from  a  number  of limitations: 
- no  data are available  concerning the aerospace activities of 
many  firms  either because  none  are published  (in the  case  of 
companies  not  required to  issue  balance sheets)
1
,  or because 
they  cannot  be  extracted  from  the  general balance  sheets of 
firms  partly  (and  sometimes  mainly)  engaged  on  other activities2; 
- it is not  accurate  to add  together,  or  even  simply  compare, 
figures  for  different  firms  working  in the  same  branch  and  the 
same  country:  every undertaking has its own  logic and history 
and,  among  other ways,  this is expressed in the  criteria which 
it applies in evaluating items  in the  balance  sheet; 
if figures  from  the  balance  sheets of  companies  operating in 
different countries are  compared  or added  together,  further 
inaccuracies  creep in because  the  companies  concerned operate 
under different  economic  and political conditions. 
In view of these reservations,  great  caution must  be  exercised in 
aggregating the  figures  from  the  balance  sheets of several firms: 
in particular,  the  last reservation excludes  any reasonable  pos-
sibility of  compiling  even  a  tentative  consolidated balance sheet 
for the  main  aerospace  firms  of the  EEC.  Since,  for  the  reasons 
stated,  no  balance sheets are available for  a  number  of aerospace 
firms,  our analysis is limited to  the  following  countries and 
companies& 
1  This applies to almost all German  aerospace  companies. 
2  E.G.,  Hawker  Siddeley  (UK),  Fiat (Italy),  North  American  Rockwell 
(USA),  etc. 
314 France:  Nord-Aviation,  Sud-Aviation,  Breguet,  Snecma, 
Matra  and  Turbomeca  {economic  indices  were 
calculated for  the first three  only); 
United Kingdom:  British Aircraft  Corporation,  Rolls  Royce, 
Hawker  Siddeley Group  {figures  for aircraft 
and missiles  cannot  be  separated from  the 
overall balance sheet); 
United States:  Boeing,  Douglas,  McDonnell,  Lockheed,  General 
Dynamics,  North  American,  Grumman,  Northrop 
Aerojet General,  United Aircraft. 
1  The  figures  discussed below mostly refer to  1966  ;  the  exceptions 
will be  indicated as  they  occur. 
1  Douglas  and McDonnel  are  dealt with separately in the  USA 
for this reason;  the  figures  for North  American  precede 
the latter's merger  with Rockwell. 
315 1  3.2.2  Investment  and  sources  of  finance 
The  pattern of the  consolidated balance  sheets of  the  companies 
named  was  as  follows  on  31  December  1966  (in percentages): 
Relationship  between  the  Consolidated Balance  Sheets of Certain 
French,  British and  American  Aerospace Undertakings 
on  December  1966 
France  United Kingdom  United States 
Floating capital  20.7  45.4  39.0 
Net  technical assets  41.5  19.5  44.0 
Other assets and  deferred  37.8  35.1  17.0 
charges 
Invested capital  100.0  100.0  100.0  ----- =====  ----- ----- -----
Made  up  of: 
Medium  and  long  term  debts  54.1  26.5  26.0 
Own  capital  45.9  73.5  74.0 
100.0  100.0  100.0  ----- ----- =====  ----- -----
1  The  term  "investments" is used here as  meaning  "capital used 
for  •••" and is defined as: 
a)  Total net assets:  total assets net  of depreciation 
b)  Current assets:  cash  +  short-term loans  +  production waste 
+  finished  products 
c)  Current liabilities:  short-term debts 
d)  Floating capital:  current assets  - current liabilities 
e)  Invested capital:  floating capital +  net  technical assets  + 
shareholdings  +  deferred  charges 
f)  Own  capital:  firm's  capital +  reserves  +  undistributed 
profits  (or less accumulated losses) 
316 The  following  points may  be  noted  concerning capital investeda 
the proportion of floating capital is high in the United King-
dom  and  the  USA.  This is due  mainly to  the  varying proportion 
of medium-term loans. 
In France,  the assets side of balance sheets includes a  big 
item for  credits deferred for  more  than one  year,  wbich  do 
not  therefore appear under  "Current assets" but under  "Other 
assets and  deferred charges". 
The  percentage  of net technical assets is very low in the 
United Kingdom  and  the  figure  of 19.5%  cannot fail to arouse 
some  perplexity. 
The  percentage  of  "Other assets and  deferred charges" is high 
in France  and  the United Kingdom.  Apart  from  the earlier com-
ment  regarding deferred loans,  the  explanation lies in the 
different proportion of holdings in associated  companies. 
Moreover,  in the  case  of the United States, it should be  noted 
that the amount  of capital tied up  in leasing aircraft is 
higher than in Europe  both absolutely and relatively. 
The  statistics available in the  countries under  review do  not 
give details of investment  in the  separate branches. 
This  being so,  we  compared  a  number  of  firms,  taking the air-
frame  and  engine  branches separately.  Our results are set out 
in the table  on  the next  page: 
317 Investment in a  Number  of French,  British and  American Aerospace Firms 
(1956} 
(Millions of dollars) 
France  UK  USA 
SUD- BR I Tl SH  A  I R- BOEI~G 
1\VJAT!OrJ  CRAFT  CO~P. 
Airframes 
Net  total assets  562.8  221,7  1 ,44·1. 5 
Invested capital  239,3  138,1  1,076.7 
Net  technical assets  89,5  38,4  426.5 
Net  total assets per  employee  22,209  6,471  11,241 
Invested capital per  employee  9,443  4,031  8,378 
Net  techn.assets per  employee  3,531  1,120  3,319 
Engines  S~,ECMA  ROLLS  ROYCE 
UNITED 
ARICRAFT 1 
Net  total assets  273.6  618,7  1  ,o4&,1 
Invested capital  105.1  407,9  558,3 
Net  technical assets  44,3  71,6  263,3 
Net  total assets per  employee  22,352  7,332  12,826 
Invested capital per employee  s16S8  4,838  6,845 
Net  techn.assets per employee  3,619  848  3,228 
1 No  separate figures available  for Pratt and  Whitney. 
318 Aa  regards  sources of finance,  we  simply note that  "Own  capital" 
is the major  source  in both the United Kingdom  and  the United 
States.  One  result of this is a  decisively more  favourable  degree 
of financial autonomy. 
3.2.3 Profitability of firms  and  other economic  indicators 
Profitability was  considered by  reference  to turnover,  net total 
assets and  own  capital;  the  annual rate of turnover  of net total 
assets was  also. taken into account. 
Figures  for  the  period 1962-66 are  given in the  table  on  the 
next  page. 
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 It must  at once  be  pointed out  that  the  figures  for  the  United 
Kingdom  are  not as homogeneous  as  those  for France  and  the 
United States because  of  the  leading position occupied  by  the 
motor vehicle  branch  (Rolls  Royce)  and  because  of  the  weight  of 
a  major  group  such as Hawker  Siddeley,  which is not  exclusively 
aeronautical.  Comparison  between the  USA  and France  shows: 
- the profits of French  firms  are rather  low in relation to 
turnover,  but  the  American  figure,  though higher,  is still 
below that  for  other branches of industry  (e.g.,  motor vehi-
cles). 
- nevertheless,  the  high annual rate of  turnover of net total 
assets enables  American  firms  to  earn a  good  return on  total 
investments;  this is not  so  in the  case  of French  firma,  whose 
rate of turnover is well below unity. 
The  problem appears  to  be  particularly difficult both in the 
form  stated and  even  more  so  when  these  figures  are correlated 
to  the  higher level of  investment  per head already noted in 
American  firms  as  compared  with their French counterparts. 
- profit on  own  capital,  which is very  good  in the  USA,  appears 
to be  inadequate  in France,  where  the  most  important  feature 
is that the relative proportion of risk capital to total 
sources of capital is distiD±ly lower. 
Excluding the German  firms,  for  which,  as already noted,  no 
balance  sheets are accessible  the  comments  for French  firms  can 
be  extended  to  the  other aerospace  firms  of the  EEC' countries. 
The  final picture is far  from  rosy: 
- the  low turnover of assets  may  indicate that capital is not 
being used  to  the  full; 
- the  low rate of profit militates against  the accumulation of 
capital and  the  recruitment  of labour. 
321 It should  be  borne  in mind,  however,  that  the profit rates of 
aerospace  firms  are  low  throughout  the  Western  world;  a  fair 
return on total investments  must  therefore  be  sought  by in-
creasing the  annual  turnover of capital. 
3.3 Specialization,  Integration and Diversification of Production 
A characteristic feature  of almost all ae~ospace firms  (airframe 
branch)  has  always  been their almost  exclusive  concentration on 
that branch.  The  exceptions are either big  financial  groups  (e.g., 
Hawker  Siddeley Group  Ltd,  LTV,  etc.)  or  companies  formed  by  the 
relatively recent  merging  of aircraft firms  with  firms  from  other 
branches  of activity (e.g.,  North American Rockwell). 
On  the  other hand,  for  firms  making  engines,  the aircraft side 
is generally one  of several activities and  in some  cases  (e.g., 
General Electric)  not  even  the  most  important. 
Demand  has always  been  characterized by  the  clear dominance  of 
government  orders. 
The  picture is not  as  clear as that,  however;  particularly over 
the  last twenty years,  many  positions have  changed,  as regards 
both supply and  demand,  as part of a  process which is still con-
tinuing. 
In the years  immediately after the  war,  aircraft  firms  were  en-
gaged almost  wholly  on  defence  orders;  90%  of their turnover was 
accounted  for by military equipment.  The  proportion of  government 
orders  in the  turnover of the  aerospace  industry has  since gradual-
ly declined1  and  demand  has  become  diversified almost  everywhere. 
1  In 1967,  the proportion of government  orders  in the  tur~over 
of the aerospace  industry was  65.3%  in the  EEC,  62.6%  in the 
United Kingdom  and  75.  3%  in the  United States. 
322 The  missile and  space  programmes  have  provided the  new  firms 
with subjects for research and  have  thus stimulated the  growth 
of secondary branches  such as  those  concerned with equipment 
(electronics in particular). 
The  establishment  of civil space authorities in a  number  of 
countries has also introduced a  new  customer,  who  has  made  quite 
a  lot of  changes,  especially in relations with the  industry and 
more  particularly in the  United States. 
On  the  supply side,  therefore,  all or almost all aircraft firms 
have  diversified considerably and  have  added  R&D  and  the pro-
duction of missiles and  space  hardware  to  their traditional range 
of activities. 
From  firms'  point  of view,  government  demand,  whether military 
or civil (space)  has  a  number  of disadvantages,  which  may  be  too 
great  when  the  proportion of the  firm's  total activit'  goes 
beyond  a  certain limit.  These  disadvantages  include: 
- The  limited strength of firms  (taken separately)  when  negoti-
ating contracts with  the  government  exposes  them  to serious 
risks arising from  factors  over which  they  have  no  control, 
such as variations in the  quality and  quantity of government 
orders  (budget  fluctuations,  changes  in strategy and  therefore 
in the  relative importance  of different  types  of armaments, 
etc.)  or the  introduction of new  regulations  for  contracts 
(which  may,  for  example,  require  firms  to  use  a  large amount 
of their own  capital). 
- The  return  on  government  orders is generally low  and  normally 
less than  that on  private orders,  as  can be  seen  from  the  graph 
(Fig.  12)  on  the  next  page. 
On  the  other hand,  government  orders offer firms'  substantial 
advantages,  including: 
323 Return on Government  and Private Orders in Terms  of Total Capital 
Invested  (TCI)  in the  Main  American Firms 
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7,3 
7,4 the possibility of undertaking  R&D  in the  most  advanced fields 
and of acquiring the  corresponding knowhow,  which  can then be 
transferred to  their own  lines of production; 
- the  provision of plant and  tools free  or virtually free  of 
charge; 
- adequate  finance  for  R&D  and production; 
- a  relatively certain work  ceiling,  which will keep plant 
running at satisfactory capacity and  ensure relatively stable 
employment,  thus providing an adequate  return on  total invest-
menta. 
As  a  result of the  disadvantages  of government  orders,  firms  have 
concentrated a  considerable part of their resources  on  commercial 
activities,  particularly in recent years.  In many  countries, 
moreover,  the  government  is not  a  complete  stranger to this new 
development,  for  throughout  the  world  governments  are  making 
decisive  mo~es to  support  commercial aircraft firms.  The  reasons 
for  such intervention,  which  vary  from  country to  country,  can 
be  enumerated as  follows: 
- support  for programmes  which are  too  costly for  firms  (e.g., 
supersonic aircraft); 
- expansion of exports; 
- adequate  use  of plant; 
- stabilization of employment. 
Despite  frequent  government  support  (particularly in Europe), 
commercial aircraft production involves  very  heavy  risks1  which 
2  can have  disastrous  consequences  if they materialize. 
1  Balanced  by  an adequate  return,  however. 
2  The  American  firm  of  Convair  is a  significant example. 
325 In view of the  typical advantages  and  disadvantages  of both 
government  orders and  commercial activity,  the  main  firms  have 
adopted a  strategy of  compromise  so  that  today  the risk  tends 
to be  more  or less evenly  spread between  the  government  and 
commercial  production,  particularly by  the  leading American 
firms.  A modest  degree  of diversification,  which  must  not  be 
underestimated,  has  been started by  a  number  offirms,  mostly in 
the  USA,  which  have  entered branches  outside  the aerospace  in-
dustry  (e.g.,  shipbuilding and  oceanography)  and  the  service 
sector  (real estate  development  and planning). 
The  changes  described  above  have  taken a  number  of  sharp  turns 
in the  countries under  review. 
In the  United States,  the aircraft industry was  faced  with ex-
cess production  capacity in 1951,  when  the  government  embarked, 
even if not  avowedly,  on  a  policy of protecting companies  by 
awarding  them  contracts under  a  non-competitive  purchasing 
1 .  1  po  1cy  • 
That  year  saw  the start of the  missiles programmes,  which  were 
not,  however,  sufficient to absorb the  excess production capacity. 
The  Korean  War  speeded  up  expenditure  on  both aircraft and  mis-
siles,  but this  flow  was  suddenly  cut off in 19572•  Firms  which 
had  meanwhile  been  forced  to resort to  government  protection had 
to  find  new  markets,  to  adapt  to  the  changed  government  demand 
and,  from  1961-62  onwards,  to a  new  contracting policy3• 
1  Or  competitive  only at  the  design  stage. 
2  Some  monhs  befqr~ the  first Sputnik was  launched. 
3  See  Annex  9  - "United States Contracting Policy:  DoD  and NASA"· 
326 Firms'  policy of diversifying production has  been of particular 
interest as  offering new  solutions to the authorities. 
Convair,  for  example,  used its own  resources  to  finance  part of 
the  ICBM  missile  programme;  before  the  Mercury  programme,  four 
1  firms .independently started major  space  research  ;  and the 
Apollo  programme  benefited  from  original contributions  from  a 
large  number  of  firms. 
Many  undertakings successfully  embarked  on  ~ policy of  diver~y.Wg 
demand  (commercial aircraft)  and lines of products. 
Efforts have also been  made  to apply  the  branch's  techniqu~and 
capacity to activities outside  the aircraft industry. 
This  type  of diversification,  which accounts  for  only a  small 
fraction  (no  more  than  2%)  of aerospace sales,  was  mainly achieved 
by  the  absorption of firms  from  other branches of industry. 
2  Lastly, all the  main airframe  companies  moved  more  or less mar-
ginally into the  equipment  branch  by  setting up  their own  divi-
sions or by  taking over electronics firms.  Over  the  same  period 
the  United Kingdom  has  witnessed  a  process of vertical integration 
and specialization by  branches,  as part of government  policy for 
the  reorganization of the aircraft industry.  The  development  of 
1 
For  example,  McDonnell,  who  won  the  contract,  had  been engaged 
in studies on  the subject  for  11  months. 
2  Predominantly those  with assets exceeding  $200  million (see 
Section 3.1). 
327 commercial aircraft has also been encouraged1  as  a  means  of re-
ducing excess production capacity. 
Only  one  company,  Hawker  Siddeley,  which  was  mainly  engaged  on 
defence  orders,  has  extended its activities to other branches  of 
industry,  by  taking over electrical,  metallurgical and other 
companies. 
Among  the  EEC  countries,  only France,  beginning in 1957  and  with 
government  support,  has  adopted a  policy of specialization by 
branches and  by  products.  Attempts  to diversify production in 
other branches  of industry have  been significant,  while  there is 
only  one  previous  example  (Caravella)  from  the  commercial aircraft 
sector.  More  recently,  Dassault first set up  an  electronics di-
vision and later (1968)  began to  produce  civil aircraft. 
In the  remaining  Community  countries,  only  the  Netherlands  has 
sought  to diversify production;  it should  be  noted,  however,  that 
in the absence  of  such a  policy the national industry would  have 
found it very difficult to  surv~ve with such a  narrow military 
market  in the  Netherlands. 
In the  cases of Germany,  Italy and  Belgium,  problems relating to 
reorganization of their respective industries and  the  narrowness 
of the national markets  explain  why  there  have  as yet  been  no 
special diversification problems  in the  commercial aircraft sector. 
3.4 Collaboration between Firms 
Collaboration between  firms is now  essential because  of the  com-
plexity of products and of the  process of making aircraft2, 
1  By  a  government  contribution to  R&D. 
2  See  Section 2.2 above. 
328 missiles and  space  equipment. 
The  first and simplest  forms  of collaboration are usually com-
mercial agreements  (after-sales assistance and  maintenance), 
exchanges  of technical information  (knowhow)  and,  most  important 
1  of all,  licence agreements  • 
Side  by  side with agreements  of this kind,  the sixties were 
marked  by  increasing cooperation between  firms2  in the matter 
of research and/or production,  through contracting and  sub-
oontraoting3,  oo-produotion4 and  joint participation5• 
There  are  marked  differences  between  the  American  and European 
approaches  to  collaboration;  the  basic reasons  would  appear  to 
lie in the  differences between their political and  economical 
systems  and  between  the  sizes of their industries,  firms  and 
markets;  This  may  explain,  without  wholly  justifying,  European 
solutions which at first sight may  appear inconsistent. 
1 
2 
These  agreements,  which are extremely important  for the  EEC 
industry,  are  dealt with in Chapter  4  (The  Technological 
Balance  of Payments). 
Stemming  from  agreements  between  governments  in some  oases. 
3  Meaning  the  supply of parts which  the  purchasing  company 
could  make  (sub-contracting)  or is not  technically equipped 
to make  (contracting). 
4  With  the  main  contractor responsible  for  R&D  and production 
costs. 
5  Meaning  that several firms  participate as  prime  contractors. 
329 We  shall now  consider how  the  most  widespread  forms  of  collabora-
1  tion have  evolved differently in the United States and in Europe. 
In  the United States contracting and sub-contracting have  now 
assumed  substantial proportions2•  American  leader  firms  tend in-
creasingly to regard  themselves as  systems  designer,  integrator 
and  manager,  or,  in other words,  they  tend to coordinate,  direct 
and  supervise  a  productive  process  which  to  a  large  extent  takes 
place  away  from  the  firm itself. In so  doing,  the  leader  firm 
tends  to specialize not  only in management  (of systems  and  pro-
grammes)  but also in the  productive  process  for  which it is best 
equipped,  namely,  the  final assembly  of the  system. 
Many  contracting firms  both in America  and  in other countries -
although in fewer  numbers  and  mostly for  contingent  reasons  -
are  involved in this process. 
The  government  is not  unconnected with the  growth of this trend. 
Indeed  one  of the  general aims  of the  contracting policy of the 
Department  of Defence  is to promote  sub-contracting3  as  fully as 
possible,  particularly with small businesses4• 
1  This  problem is discussed in detail in the  "National Reports" 
which  should be  consulted for further information. 
2  Around  40-50%  of the leader's turnover  goes  on  supplies  from 
contractors and/or sub-contractors. 
3  In order to  keep  employment  fairly stable,  particularly in 
relatively underdeveloped areas  and  to  spread the  relevant 
technical knowhow  over the  whole  country. 
4  Firms  employing less than 500  men. 
330 In our view,  this line of action has at least three  basic 
advantages: 
a)  it gives the  leader a  degree  of flexibility which  would 
otherwise  be  impossible; 
b)  it spreads  technical  knowho~ and  widens  participation in 
industrial development  without  any  dispersal of resources, 
because it allows  firms  to specialize at all levels; 
c)  the  channelling of government  and  commercial  orders to a 
few  leader firms  avoids  on  the  one  hand excessive  con-
centration1  and  on  the  other coordinates industrial devel-
opment  and  the  spread of  knowhow  mentioned in b)  above. 
The  establishment  of the  biggest  firms  as leaders in the 
sector,  receiving the principal orders and  jointly organ-
izing the  whole  sub-contracting system,  ensures  that the 
sector as  a  whole  benefits  from  government  contracts and 
finance  on  a  centralized basis. 
The  position in Europe  as  regards  contracting and  sub-contracting
2 
is somewhat  different in many  respects. 
First and  foremost,  foreign  contractors are rarely employed  on 
national programmes3• 
1 
2 
Which,  at the  extreme,  would  mean  that the  government  was  the 
sole operator. 
These  terms  are used with the  same  meanings  as  for  the  USA; 
they therefore  exclude  for  the  moment  mixed'forms of con-
tracting  (or  sub-contractin~ and  co-production. 
3  Or  the  national parts of international programmes. 
331 In the light of the  European political situation,  this certainly 
has  some  significance but,  when  the  problem is considered at 
European level and  from  the strictly economic  and productive 
standpoint,  there  is serious waste  due  to  the  duplication of 
effort,  the impossibility of specializing properly and  the small-
ness  of sub-contracting firms. 
Furthermore,  with the  exception  (although not  complete)  of the 
duplication of effort,  it would appear  to us  that the  last two 
factors are also present at national level,  and this considerably 
worsens  the  position of the  European aerospace industry. 
Indeed,  for reasons  which  may  be attributed,  not  merely as  a 
first approximation,  to the  characteristics of the  various nation-
al markets  (inadequate and  widely fluctuating volume  of demand) 
situations have arisen in the  European countries with a  number 
of not dissimilar features  which  can be  briefly described as 
follows: 
The  size of the  leader firms,  although increased by  successive 
concentrations,  has  not  gone  beyond  a  certain point and has  in 
no  case reached European level. In this process,  the  firms  con-
cerned have  only specialized marginally along the  American lines 
(management  of programmes  and final assembly of systems)  nor in 
fact  would  full specialization have  been possible.  The  whole 
system has  been conditioned by  the  inadequacy and variability 
of demand: 
- in the  case  of contracting  firms,  it has  hindered speciali-
zation,  checked its growth or even militated against its 
emergence; 
- in the  case  of the  leader firms,  it has  prevented speciali-
zation because  the  lack of outside suppliers has  had  to  be 
made  good  or  a  certain level of  employment  has  even  had  to 
be  maintained. 
332 This has  resulted in national production systems  which,  under 
the  influence of an  inadequate  and variable internal demand, 
have  developed sporadically and  with characteristics  (size 
and quality)  ill-suited to an  extension of the  industrial 
process  to the  European level.  At  the  same  time,  as noted 
previously,  efforts expended at national level have  resulted 
in duplication at European level. 
The  foregoing  remarks  do  not  mean  that governments  and  firms 
in the  EEC  countries and  the  United Kingdom  have  not  pursued a 
policy of widening  the participation of national firms  in the 
process of production,  because  they  have  in fact  done  so.  In 
particular,  when  the  government  has  intervened,  work  has as  a 
rule been distributed at national level having regard to  firms' 
work plans  (with the  main purpose  of maintaining  employment  in 
the sector)  and  to  their specialization. 
Other  forms  of collaboration to be  found  in the  United States 
are  co-production and  joint participation. 
1  The  first  finds its own  justification in the  complexity of 
current aircraft programmes  and in the  heavy risks associated 
with their implementation. 
Under this form  of collaboration,  the  co-producing  firms  assume 
part of the  econo~ic and  financial risks of individual pro-
grammes.  Specially,  they are responsible  for  financing  R&D, 
tooling and  carrying through  the  order placed with them,  for  a 
2  predetermined production run  ,  regardless of the  fact that the 
theoretical break-even point  may  be  reached and/or  exceeded. 
1 
2 
This is relatively recent  (the  DC  9  was  the  first programme) 
and is not  proving easy to establish. 
Derived  from  research designed to evaluate  the potential 
market,  carried out  by  the  leader and  sometimes  by  the 
co-producers. 
333 Joint participation,  on  the  other hand,  is characterized by 
the shared responsibility  (within a  single programme)  of the 
prime  contractors1  and is  found  typically in the  case  of mis-
sile and  space  programmes,  although the aircraft industry also 
offers a  few  examples. 
In other words,  the  prime  contractors are responsible  for all 
R&D,  design  and  construction work  relating to  the  part  they 
have  to  make  and  for  the  choice  and  coordination of sub-
contractors. 
In Europe,  co-production and  joint participation2  have  been 
and still are  found at a  level which generally goes  beyond 
national frontiers  uGd  can  thus  be  defined as  the  typical 
forms  of cooperation between European  countries.  In our earlier 
remarks  on  the production process  in the  aeronautical industry3 
and,  before  that,  on  the  problems  of contracting and sub-
contracting,  the  premises and  conditions  for multinational 
collaboration in Europe  were  defined sufficiently clearly. It 
is fair to say,  therefore,  that in the situation described such 
collaboration may  be  considered "an essential condition for  the 
very survival of the  European aircraft industries"4• 
1  Nominated  by  the  government  agency. 
2  The  first chiefly for aircraft and  the  second  for  space  work. 
3  See  Sections 2.2 et seq. 
4  M.  Ziegler:  Speech at the  Symposium  on  "The  importance of 
the aircraft industry for  Europe's  economic  and  technical 
future"  organized  by  AICMA  (13-14 September 1967). 
334 It is by  no  means  easy to strike a  balance  of European collab-
oration because  the  problem involves so  many  variables. 
The  first point is to repeat  our original premise  that the 
approach is correct in the  sense  that European collaboration 
is essential. 
Consequently,  however  important the qualifications which  follow 
they  must all be  evaluated by  reference  to this major  premise. 
1  European collaboration  has  been started over  the last ten 
years  both within the  EEC  and between the  Community  countries 
and  the United Kingdom  by: 
- NATO  (e.g.,  Atlantic,  F  104  and  Hawk  programmes) 
- firms  (e.g.,  F  28,  VFW  614,  SA  330,  SA  340  and  WG  13 
programmes) 
- governments  (e.g.,  Concorde,  Airbus  and  MRCA  75  programmes). 
In general, collaboration has related to  R&D  and/or production 
and in many  cases  has  been initiated by  governments  who  have 
provided the  necessary money  and  assumed  the  risks  involved. 
It is important  to note  that  even  in the  case  of programmes 
launched by private  firms,  the  governments  of the  countries 
concerned  have  provided  some  of the  money  required for  R&D. 
It is immediately apparent,  therefore,  that the  outstanding 
feature  of European collaboration is active  intervention by 
governments,  which  finance  and often promote  military and  com-
mercial programmes,  in addition to  purchasing the  defence 
equipment  produced. 
1 
Regarding  European  cooperation in space activities,  see 
Chapter 2,  Section B - "Space  Activities". 
335 This at once  reveals  two  of the  main advantages  of collabora-
tion.  When  several countries cooperate in the  same  programme 
it is possible: 
a)  to spread the  cost  of  R&D  and  the  relevant risks propor-
tionately; 
b)  to increase  demand1  with  the  attendant possibility of 
extending production runs  and thus cutting unit  costs. 
These  two  basic advantages  lead on to others: 
- the division of R&D  work  enables  each  country not  only to 
limit the  risks involved,  but also to benefit  from  the ex-
perience of others in at least two  ways:  the first,  which 
is obvious,  concerns  the  contribution of each  country to 
the  development  of the  product;  the second,  which is less 
apparent  but  no  less important,  is the  transfer of knowhow 
which  takes place informally in any  group  working  together; 
- the  extension of production runs  enables  the  participating 
countries to acquire sophisticated machines  for  an outlay 
which is acceptable overall;  otherwise,  the individual  coun-
tries would  have  to  do  without  modern  equipment  unless  they 
carried through certain programmes  alone,  which  would  involve 
the necessary  R&D  and  production capabilities in addition to 
a  vast capital outlay; 
collaboration may  have  the  further advantage  of overcoming 
the  p~oduction bottlenecks which  exist in the  various Euro-
pean countries.  This  should not  be  taken  to  mean  that the 
aircraft industries of certain countries are  unable  to under-
take  major  programmes  on  their own. 
On  the other hand,  their productive  capability is doubtful, 
1  Especially military. 
336 i.e., their capacity to  turn out  large  numbers  of aircraft 
at a  high rate of production. 
Having  enumerated  the  main  advantages  of  collaboration,  to which 
we  may  later wish  to add  others  (actual or potential),  we  shall 
now  consider the  other side  of the  coin.  Some  of the  disadvan-
tages are  technical or concerned with production.  They  include: 
- different units of measurement,  standards and regulations; 
- test methods  and  equipment are not  always  comparable; 
- working  methods  are  not  the  same,  with the result that the 
various  elements in production costs are allocated differently; 
- differences in methods  of  organization,  in standards relating 
to interchangeability and in specifications. 
Other and more  serious disadvantages apply to  R&D  and production 
costs.  Ziegler1  maintained that: 
- the  need  to align working methods  and  standards adds  10-20% 
to the capital outlay2  and this figure  may  rise to 30-50%  if 
there are several versions of the  same  programme. 
In the  case of cooperation between  two  countries only and 
limited to this stage  of the  programme,  the  cost  for  each of 
them  may  therefore  vary between 55  and  75%  of what  they  would 
have  had to  spend if they had undertaken  the project alone. 
On  the  other hand,  Ziegler claims that there are substantial 
savings  on production coats:  extension of the production run 
cuts average  production costs - for  labour - by  18-20% if twice 
the  number  of aircraft are built and 33-36%  if four  times as 
many  are made. 
1  M.  Ziegler:  op.cit. 
2  R&D,  documentation,  tooling and testing. 
337 These  figures offer a  first assessment  of the  problem in un-
questionably objective  terms  guaranteed by  the  competence  of 
the  author quoted. 
A few  additional points  must  be  noted,  however. 
Ziegler was  referring to the  case  of a  programme  started with 
the  construction of a  single prototype  - although provision was 
made  for possible variants - and  carried through  on  a  single 
assembly line. This interpretation is supported by  the  fact 
that: 
the  construction of two  prototypes is not  specifically 
mentioned; 
- no  reference is made  to  doubling the  assembly line  (for 
sub-groups  and  the airframe); 
the  relative cut  in labour costs is based  on  an 80%  learning 
curve;  if there  were  two  assembly lines,  each with an  80% 
learning curve,  the  saving  on  overall production would  be 
less because  learning costs would  be  doubled. 
Among  the advantages  of collaboration,  we  mentioned  that with 
several assembly lines it is possible  to use  the  industrial 
resources of the participating countries to turn out  large 
numbers  of aircraft at an acceptable  overall rate. 
This arrangement,  which in our  view is essential in almost all 
cases,  does  not  necessarily double  R&D  costs  through the  con-
struction of  two  prototypes,  but it certainly does  increase  the 
cost of tooling for production and  of actual manufacture. 
It is virtually impossible  to  evaluate  these  higher  costs but 
their components  can  be  estimated. 
Assuming  two  assembly lines producing the  same  number  of air-
craft and with exactly the  same  rates of production as  a 
338 1 
single line  ' 
there should be  no  increase in cost  for  the  major  sub-systems 
(engines,  undercarriages,  standard equipment,  etc.); 
- the  cost of tooling for  production and  for line and final 
testing will be  doubled2; 
- as already stated,  the  duplication of line launching costs 
will involve  some  diseconomies  on  total production; 
- there will be  similar effects,  although with less  incidence 
on total costs,  as regards  suppliers of parts,  who  for reasons 
connected with the  organization of production will only be 
able  to  feed  one  of the  two  assembly lines. 
In addition to these specific observations,  there is another of 
greater importance. 
Duplication of assembly lines was  assumed  because  no  European 
firm is at present  capable  of turning out  large  numbers  quickly. 
It was  added  that the  same  result  could  be  obtained  by  sub-
dividing the  production  run  between  two  or more  manufacturers 
to  make  optimum  use  of the  existing production potential of each 
of them. 
1  As  already stated,  this assumption  cannot  be  regarded as 
valid for European countries if long aircraft production 
runs are  involved. 
2  The  same  applies,  to  a  slightly less extent,  when  both 
assembly lines are set up  in a  single  firm. 
339 In other words,  this means  that: 
- none  of the participating firms  has  to invest large  sums 
in premises,  plant·,  machinery  and  fixed  equipment; 
- the rate of production of the individual firms  is thus not 
increased; 
- the  production costs of the separate  firms  cannot  be  lowered 
because  they lack adequate  fixed assets. 
Thus,  while  large orders  can be  handled by  cooperative produc-
tion,  this system does  not  yet appear  capable of resolving cer-
tain fundamental  problems  of the  European aerospace  industry. 
The  cyclic  (and indeed,  episodic)  character of both the national 
and  international demand  generated by  collaboration between a 
n~ber of countries,  combined  with  the  short runs  which,  for a 
variety of reasons,  firms  have  to produce,  prevent  any  long-
term planning.  The  effects,  which  have  already been  discussed 
in part,  seem  to be: 
- consistent  investment  plans  cannot  be  formulated; 
- the rationalization of  production and  firms  is not started; 
- consequently,  firms  do  not  specialize adequately. 
- there is no  coordination or specialization of the  productive 
structure of contractors and  sub-contractors. 
A frequent  feature  of European collaboration is the  formation of 
various types  of consortium and association for  the  time  re-
quired to  complete specific programmes.  These  are  major instru-
ments  for  centralizing the  management  of projects and allow a 
constructive  exchange  of information,  technical knowledge  and 
knowhow~ 
On  the  other hand,  their limited life implies a  considerable 
340 dispersal of  experience acquired under  circumstances  which 
virtually cannot  be  repeated. 
The  formation  of such associations also raises legal problems; 
the  law varies  from  country  to  country in Europe  and this is 
an obstacle to the  formulation of standard statutory regulations. 
When  there is no  centralized body  or  when  one  exists but  does 
not  work  properly,  there  may  be  substantial diseconomies  on 
programmes,  with additional costs which  can  be  very  considerable 
and serious delays  on  deliveries. 
There  has  been,  and still is,  a  large  measure  of multinational 
cooperation in Europe.  The  main aeronautical and missile pro-
jects handled in this way  are listed on  the  next  page  (Fig.  13). 
The  progress  of  some  of them  (MRCA  75,  Panther,  Transall, 
1  Phantom  ,  Jaguar,  Concorde  and  Airbus  A 300)  is described in 
detail in Annex  10:  "International Collaboration in Aircraft 
Production",  while  the Atlantic and Tyne  programmes  are briefly 
outlined in the  next  few  pages. 
1  As  an  example  of collaboration between the  United  Kingdom 
and  the United States. 
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 Atlantic  programme  (sea reconnaissance aircraft) 
Studies started in 1956  by  the larger powers  - France,  the 
United Kingdom  and  the United States;  the  scope  of the  basic 
programme  was  then extended to all the  NATO  countries.  The 
final operational definition was  approved  by  NATO  at the  end 
of 1957. 
The  United States put  up·some  of the  money  and  the  manu-
facturing licence  was  granted free  of charge  to the  American 
fi~m of Grumman. 
The  industrial agreement  (late 1959)  brought  together Dutch, 
Belgian and German  firms,  under Breguet  (France)  as  prime 
contractor. 
A multinational steering committee1  was  set up  by  the  govern-
ments,  with unified,  centralized management  which adopted  the 
principle of fixed-price  contracts and  unanimous  decisions2• 
At  industrial level,  a  limited liability company  (SECBAT)  was 
formed  and  managed  by Breguet. 
The  first production aircraft were  delivered in December 
19653;  production is still continuing. 
1 
2 
Five countries. 
Each  member  (including those  not  concerned with production 
as the United States)  has  the  right of veto;  this is why 
the United States were  able  to block an order of 60 air-
craft for South Africa. 
3  Within the  planned  time  limit. 
343 - Tyne  programme  (engine  for Atlantic and Transall aircraft) 
This is an agreement  to collaborate  in production under. 
licence. 
At  government  level,  the  two  Atlantic and Transall  Comm~ees 
are responsible  for  management;  at industrial level,  the 
work  of the  committee is greatly complicated by  the  absence 
of a  company. 
Owing  to the  existence  of the  Atlantic Committee,  the pre-
liminary work  lasted only six months. 
The  need  to move  parts and  sub-groups  have  caused  time  to 
be  lost in carrying out  the  work;  there has also been  dup-
lication of assembly tools and  test benches  because  the 
French and German  governments  each  wishes  to have  mainte-
nance  and  overhaul facilities. 
Full-scale production is now  in progress. 
344 4.  CHANGES  IN  THE  ECONOMIC  CHARACTERISTICS  OF  THE  AERONAUTICAL 
AND  SPACE  INDUSTRY 
4.1  Employment 
4.1.1 General 
Before  1960,  and particularly from  1957  to 1960  numbers  employed 
throughout  the aircraft industry showed  a  declining trend. 
The  main reason  for this,  at least in the  United States and  the 
United Kingdom,  was  the  change  in military strategy,  whereby 
military aircraft were  replaced by  missiles in defence  programmes. 
Quite apart  from  the problem of technical retraining,  missiles 
caused a  substantial amount  of unemployment  and  underemployment, 
especially among  operatives. 
The  production of large  numbers  of heavy military aircraft was 
stopped almost  without  warning and,  in their place,  work  was 
started on  missiles,  which at first involved much  more  research 
than actual production. 
In addition to this element,  which  had  a  marked  effect on  employ-
ment  in the United  Kingdom  and  the United States,  a  further  cause 
of the  decline in numbers  employed  in the  EEC  industry  (excluding 
France)  was  the  completion of work  under  licence  on  major  defence 
programmes,  followed  by  a  sharp  drop  in the  demand  for  new  air-
craft. 
Since  then,  however,  employment  in the aerospace  industry has 
risen almost  continuously in the  Community  countries and  the 
United States,  but  not  in the United Kingdom  (Fig.  14). 
In  the United States,  numbers  employed  in the  aerospace  industry 
rose  from  956,000  in 1960  to 1,168,000 in 1967  (Tables  2/1  and 
345 2/1~), with alight drops  in 1961,  1964  and 19651• 
The  average annual increase of 2.9%  can  be  attributed to partial 
reconversion of aeronautical firma2  from  aircraft to missiles 
and apace  material. 
Employment  in the  actual construction of aircraft continued to 
fall until 1965  (458,000)  and despite  a  renewed rising trend3, 
numbers  employed  had still not  regained the  1960  level by 1967 
(610,000 as against 638,000). 
1  This decline is linked with the  completion of certain 
missile  programmes  (source:  Department  of  Commerce).  Ac-
cording to official AIA  statistics numbers  employed in 
the aerospace  industry rose  from  1,074;ooo to 1,392,000. 
It is inadvisable  to use  these  figures  for  purposes  of 
comparison  because  they include  some  men  from  SIC  36 
(electrical machinery  industry)  employed  on missile and 
space  work,  but  not  belonging to the  aerospace  sector. 
2  See  also Section 4.1.2 below. 
3  Due  to increased  demand  for military aircraft and  a 
marked rise in demand  for  commercial  types. 
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TOTAL In the United Kingdom,  the diversification of activities did 
not  solve  the  problem  of excess  labour in the aerospace  in-
dustry in 1960. 
In this respect,  the  role of  commercial aircraft and,  even 
more,  of apace activity proved inadequate.  Furthermore,  the 
cancellation of many  missile  and military aircraft projects 
aggravated the  inevitable  downward  trend of employment  in the 
United Kingdom,  where  numbers  fell by  an  average  of 2.7%  per 
annum,  from  291,000  in  1960  to 254,000 in 1967. 
In the European  Community,  employment  in the  aerospace  indus-
try rose  continuously over  the  period under review,  at an 
average  rate  of  4.8%  per annum,  from  118,000 in 1960  to 164,000 
in 1967,  distributed as  follows  between  the  member  countries: 
Employme.nt  in the  EEC  Aerospace  Industry 
( 1967) 
Numbers  Percentages 
(thousands) 
France  101  61.5 
Germany  35  21.3 
Italy  17  10.3 
Belgium  5  3.0 
Netherlands  6  3.9 
Total EEC  164  100.0  ----- --- ____  ...,. 
348 The  overall increase,  amounting  to  46,000,  is due  to  a  rise in 
numbers  employed  in France,  Germany  and Italy;  numbers  have 
remained steady in the  Netherlands  while  there  was  a  drop  in 
Belgium  in 1964 and  1965. 
In all the  EEC  countries  except France,  the  biggest increase 
took place at the start of the period,  when  the various na-
tional industries began  production under licence  (USA)  on  the 
F  104 military programme.  When  this project was  completed 
(1965),  all the  countries  concerned  were  left with excess 
production capacity but  there  was  no  drop  in numbers  employed, 
except in Belgium. 
In France,  the  combination of military,  missile and space 
programmes,  with a  less significant amount  of commercial pro-
duction,  maintained a  more  regular increase at a  rate of 2,000 
to 4,000 per annum. 
In 1967,  the United States reached the  record figure  of 
1  1,168,000  which  was  one  million more  than  the  number  employed 
in the  EEC  industry and  900,000  mor.e  than in the United King-
dom. 
Even if some  1501000-200,000  employed  in branches not  at~ictly 
forming part of the aeronautical industry
2  are  deducted  from 
the  American  figure,  the  US  aerospace  industry still employs 
six times as  many  men  as ita counterparts in the  EEC. 
1 
2 
Department  of Commerce  statistics;  the  AIA,  which 
includes some  workers  from  the  electronics branch 
in the  aerospace  figures,  gives  a  total of 1 1392,000 
for 1967. 
Such as  chemicals and alloys,  machinery,  etc. 
349 However,  this gap  is considerably narrowed  when  labour 
1  employed  on  missiles and  space  work  are  deducted  from  the 
American  employment  figures. 
In that  case,  if we  exclude  1966  and 1967,  when  there  was  a 
sharp  recovery  in American aircraft production,  numbers  em-
ployed in the  USA  are  only three  times2  the  EEC  figure  and 
about  twice  the British. 
It should be  noted,  however,  that over  the period under review 
employment  rose relatively faster in the United States.  Of  the 
total labour  force  of  the  EEC,  British and  American aerospace 
industries,  the  EEC's  percentage  rose  from  8  to  1~~ between 
1960  and  1967  while  the  American  percentage  increased  from 
70  to 74%. 
The  following  points  may  next  be  noted  concerning  the distri-
bution of ~abour in the  aerospace  industries of  the  three 
areas under  examination: 
- at firm  level,  the  concentration of labour  in the  three 
biggest aerospace  firms  in each area  was  as  follows,  in 
1967: 
1 
% of total numbers  employed in the 
aerospace  industry in each area 
EEC  countries  32.93 
United Kingdom  62.2 
United States  33.9 
Where  EEC  activity is minimal in terms  of numbers  employed. 
2  Around  450,000. 
3  This  percentage  will be  increased by  the  following  mergers 
which  have  already been approved:  Nord-Aviation,  Sud-Aviation 
and Sereb;  Bolkow,  Messerschmitt  and  HFB;  Fokker and  VFW 
350 - at productive unit level we  find,  in the  United States, 
a  relative concentration of labour in the places of origin 
of the various  firms.  In practice,  this is also true of 
Europe,  but  the  process  of concentration which  has  marked 
the last few  years,  affecting firms rather than productive 
structures,  has  to  some  extent led to  the  dispersal of pro-
duction centres  from  the  centre  where  decisions are taken. 
In this respect,  the  limited mobility of European aerospace 
labour is another factor,  in addition to  the virtual total 
lack or reorganization within individual  firms. 
In the aerospace industry,  technological advances  have  had  a 
marked  influence on  the structure of employment  and in par-
ticular on  the skills required. 
The  ratio of operatives to  trained staff has  been substantial-
ly reduced  by  the  transfer of  some  men  from  aircraft to  work 
on  missiles and  space  material and  by  the  increased sophisti-
cation of air transport. 
1  This  trend is clearly visible  in the  USA  ,  where  the  impact 
of the  new  technology has  undoubtedly  been greatest. 
The  table  on  the  next  page  compares  the  growth  of output with 
the  increase in numbers  of operatives  (both expressed as index 
numbers)  and  shows  how  the  importance  of operatives in the 
2  American aerospace  industry has  declined.  While  output  rose 
to 135  between  1960  and  1967,  the  index for  operatives reached 
only 117. 
1 
2 
For  example,  at the  Douglas  company  the ratio of operatives 
to engineers  was  10.5  :  1  in 1947,  3  :  1  in 1956  and  only 
1.6  :  1  in 1963. 
In constant values. 
351 Index  (1960  = 100)  of Output  and Operatives Employed  in 
the USA  (1960-67) 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966 
Aerospace  out-I 
put  (at  constant 
values)  100  102  108  109  111  110  122 
Operatives  em-
ployed in the 
aerospace  in-
dustry  100  92  96  90  87  88  107 
The  percentage  of operatives  to total numbers  employed 
the aerospace  industry was  as  follows  in 1966: 
EEC  countries  53.21 
United Kingdom  61.52 
United States  54.3 
1967 
135 
117 
in 
As  the table  on  the  next  page  sho~s,  the  technical qualifi-
cations  of employees  also varied considerably: 
1  In France  the  greater emphasis  on missiles and  space 
material had  cut this percentage to 47.4 by  1967. 
2  In 1965. 
352 Technical and scientific  % of number  employed 
work 
1953  1963 
Aerodynamics  and astrodynamics  8  18 
Airframes  29  10 
Systems  17  11 
Engines  6  6 
Electronics  20  31 
Computers  5  16 
Biology  2  2 
Nuclear  - 2 
The  higher qualifications of labour employed in the aerospace 
1  industry  raise  the  cost per employee  above  the  figure  for 
manufacturing industry.  In 1966,  in both the  USA  and the  EEC, 
the  average  cost per employee  in the aerospace  industry was 
about  30%  above  the  figure  for  manufacturing industry;  the 
actual figures  were  14,815  compared  with 13,650 in the Community 
and 18,655 against 16,690 in the United States. The  breakdown of 
2  average annual  cost per employee  according to qualifications in 
the aerospace industries of the  EEC  and  the United States was  as 
follows: 
1 
2 
Operatives  Office staff  Average  cost 
EEC  countries  (dollars)  4,080  5,695  4,815 
USA  (dollars)  7,540  9,905  8,655 
In the EEC,  the percentage  of operatives in manufacturing in-
dustry was  77%  in 1966  as  compared  with 53.2%  in the aerospace 
industry. 
Engineers,  technicians and administrative staff. 
353 For the British aerospace  industry,  the  average  annual cost per 
employee is estimated at $3,315  in 1966. 
Between  1959  and  1964,  the  average  annual  cost per  employee  in 
the aerospace  industry rose  in all three areas,  but at different 
1  rates as appears  from  the  table  below  : 
1959  1966 
EEC  countries  (dollars)  2,700  4,815  (+  78%) 
United Kingdom  (dollars)  2,240  3,315  (+  48%) 
United States  (dollars)  6,585  8,655  (+  31%) 
The  contribution of the  aerospace  branch to  the  national economy, 
measured  in terms  of the  proportion of the  total labour force  of 
manufacturing industry employed  on  aerospace  work,  was  2.9%  in 
the United Kingdom2,  6%  in the United States3 and  only 0.7%  in 
4  the  EEC  • 
1  The  various sources  used in all probability reflect non-
comparable  methods  of calculation;  allowance  must  also be 
made  for the  varying incidence  of "indirect costs"  (social 
security charges,  etc.)  in the  three areas.  For  the above 
reasons,  the  estimates  of  the  average  cost  of aerospace la-
bour should be  taken as a  guide  only. 
2  3.3%  in 1960. 
3  7.2%  (in 1967)  according to  AIA  statistics. 
4 
The  figure  of 0.7%  for  the  EEC  refers to 1965  which is the 
last year for  which  employment  figures  for the manufacturing 
industry of all member  countries are available. 
Allowing  for the earlier trend,  the  percentage  can,  however, 
be  accepted  for  1967  also. 
354 The  percentage of numbers  employed  by  aerospace  firms  in the 
total labour force  of manufacturing industry varies substan-
tially between  the  members  of the  Community,  as  can  be  seen 
from  the  table below: 
EEC  Countries:  Numbers  Employed  in the  Aerospace  Industry 
as a  Percentage of the Total Labour Force 
of Manufacturing Industry 
(1965) 
% 
France  1.73 
Germany  0.37 
Italy  0.25 
Belgium  0.31 
Netherlands  o.43 
EEC  0.69 
Only France  has  a  percentage  above  the  average  and is clearly 
the  only  country to raise  the  figure  for  the  Community. 
355 1  4.1.2 By  branches 
In 1967,  the  labour  force  was  distributed as  follows  by 
branches in the  three areas  considered: 
Branch  EEC  UK  USA  EEC  +  UK  + USA 
Number  %  Number  %  Num.ber  %  Number  % 
(  1000)  (  1000)  (  1000)  ( 1000) 
Airframes  91  55-5  99  4o.o  488  41.8  678  42.9 
Missiles  2  16  9  .• 8  20  8.o  378  32.4  414  26.2 
Engines  30  18.2  77  31.0  122  10.4  229  14.4 
Equipment3  27  16.5  52  21.0  180  15.4  259  16.5 
Total  164  100.0  248  100.0  1,168  100.0 1,580  100.0 
Expressing the  EEC  figures  from  the above  table as unity we 
·then have: 
Airframes 
Missiles and 
space vehioles 
Engines 
Equipment 
Total 
EEC 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
United Kingdom 
1.08 
1.25 
2.56 
1.92 
1.51 
1  See  Tables  2 /2,  2 /2a and  2 /3 series. 
2  Including space vehicles  for  the USA. 
United States 
5.36 
23.62 
4.06 
6.66 
7.12 
3  Including parts of airframes and  engines  for  the UK. 
356 Ignoring missiles and  space vehicles,  which are clearly an 
American preserve,  the  figures  show  a  maximum  difference of 
2.56  (engines)  in comparison with the United Kingdom  and  of 
6.66  (equipmen~ in comparison with the United States. 
They  further show  that,  when  the  EEC  +  UK  figure  is compared 
with that for  the United States,  the  difference is least in the 
case of engines as a  result of the  number  employed in the United 
Kingdom. 
The  situation so  revealed cannot  be  properly assessed,  however, 
without  considering changes  over the last few  years  and  current 
trends. 
In the United States,  while  numbers  employed  in the  engines 
branch remained almost  constant,  the  figure  for  the airframes 
branch fell sharply early in the sixties  (from 514,000  in 1960 
to 342,000 in 1962)  but this drop  was  offset by  a  marked in-
crease  in numbers  employed  on  missiles and  space  vehicles and 
on equipment.  As  total numbers  employed  remained virtually con-
stant at the start of the  decade,  part of the  labour  force  was 
obviously transferred from  airframes to missiles and space  ve-
hicles and this trend was  repeated in individual firms1• 
This means,  therefore,  that part of the  labour force  has  been 
converted and retrained for  employment  in technologically more 
advanced  branches. 
It seems  possible that the  same  sort of movement  took place in 
the  engine& branch but  the  extent  cannot  be  calculated because 
no  separate figures are available. 
1  See  Annex  7,  "Description of the  American  Aerospace  Industry~ 
357 Apart  from  transfers between  branches,  the  tables also clearly 
show  the  desire  to maintain a  steady total level of employment; 
and this aim  was  unquestionably achieved over the period under 
review. 
During  the last two  years  of the period  (1966-67),  the  rapid 
growth  of commercial aviation and  the  renewed  demand  for mili-
tary aircraft increased employment  in the  airframes  branch1 
(from 353,000 in 1965  to  488,000  in 1967)  and  consequently in 
the  industry as  a  whole. 
The  percentages reveal the  drop  in employment  in the  airframes 
branch  even  more  clearly:  53.8%  in 1960,  this figure  had  fallen 
to  41.8%  by  1967,  whereas  the relative  importance  of the  equip-
ment  branch almost  doubled  over  the  same  period  (from 8.4 to 
15.4%)2;  the  figure  for  engines fell slightly  (from  12.9 to 
10.4%)  while  that for missiles and  space  vehicles rose  (from 
3  24.9 to 32.4%)  • 
In the  United  Kingdom,  for  which reliable  figures  are available 
only  from  1963  onwards,  numbers  employed  fell sharply in the 
airframes branch  (from  131,000  in 1963  to 99,000  in 1967)  but 
remained virtually unchanged  in the other branches.  As  a  result 
the  percentage  for  the  engines branch,  which  was  already high 
in 1963  (27%),  had  reached  31%  by  1967,  with a  labour  force  of 
77,000. 
1  But still without  regaining the  1960  figure. 
2  Stimulated by  the missiles and  space  programmes. 
3  After a  peak of 39.7%  in 1963. 
358 Substantial numbers  were  employed in the  equipment  branch 
(52,000 in 1967)  and  fewer  on  missiles  (20,000 in 1967). 
In the European  Community,  the  period 1960-67  was  marked  by  a 
steady increase  in numbers  employed,  both overall and  in the 
separate branches,  so that  the  percenta~ of  each in the total 
did not  vary  much  during that  time.  In our opinion,  this 
balanced  growth  conceals  a  number  of negative aspects;  for 
the  Community  as a  whole  no  special effort was  made  as regards 
engines and  equipment  (even  though numbers  employed  in the  EEC 
were  not  and still are  not  very large)  or as  regards missiles 
and  space  vehicles,  which  might  perhaps  merit  greater interest 
because  of the  advanced  techniques  involved. 
Between  1960  and 1967,  the  position in the  individual members 
of the  European  Community  was  as  follows: 
in France,  there  was  a  balanced increase  in numbers  employed 
in all branches,  with airframes  occupying  the  leading position 
with a  labour  force  of  44,000  in 1967; 
- in Germany,  numbers  employed  in the  airframes  branch almost 
d~ubled (from  14,000 to 27,000);  the  engines and missiles 
branches  which  were  virtually non-existent in 1960  now  employ 
5,.000  and  3,000  men  respectively.  This  development,  which 
does  not  involve  large  numbers,  is  mention~d as an  example 
of positive action. 
- in  Italy~  the  only  branch to  show  some  increase  in employment 
was  airframes  (from 5,000 to  11,000);  numbers  employed  on 
missiles and  space  work are  insignificant. 
- in Belgium,  numbers  employed  rose  slightly in the  two  branches 
with which  the  national aerospace  industry is chiefly con-
cerned,  i.e., airframes  and  engines;  the  figures  for  1967  were 
3,000 and 5,000 respectively. 
359 - in the  Netherlands,  where  aerospace activity is concentrated 
on airframes,  numbers  employed  remained  unchanged. 
4.2 Output 
4.2.1  General 
The  1967  output  figures  for  the aerospace industries of the 
1  countries under review were  as  follows  : 
Value  Percentage  Member  countries' 
($  millions)  turnover as  a  per-
centage  of the val-
ue  of EEC  out;Eut 
France  1,250  4.7  71.1 
Germany  261  1  14.9 
Italy  160  0.6  9.1 
Belgium  27  0.1  1 .5 
Netherlands  60  0.2  3.4 
EEC  1,758  6.6  100.0  ----- ___ ....... 
United Kingdom  1,610  6.0 
United States  23,258  87.4 
Total EEC  +  UK  +USA  ~~~~~~  100.0  ----- -----
The  foregoing  table provides a  basis for  a  preliminary assess-
m9nt.  Both in value  and as  a  percentage,  American production is 
outstandingly high;  against this,  EEC  and United Kingdom  output 
amounts  respectively to only about  one-fifth and  one-sixth of 
the  turnover of the  American aerospace  industry.  Within the 
European  Community,  the  French industry predominates  (71.1%) 
and accounts  for a  by  no  means  negligible  4.7%  of the  total 
turnover of the  three  large areas. 
1  See  Tables  2/4,  2/4a and 2  /5 series. 
360 Behind the situation so  described lies a  decade  marked  by  many 
major events,  including three  which  may  be  identified as of 
~apital importance: 
- the arrival of the  space age; 
- the  growth of  commercial aviation; 
- the  reduced importance  of military aircraft,  offset  from  the 
operational standpoint  by  the  use  of missiles. 
The  aerospace  industries and  governments  of the  various  coun-
tries have  operated in this wide,  overall context,  which has 
naturally differed in various respects  from  country  to  country. 
We  shall first consider how  the  position changed  from  1960  to 
1967  in terms  of quantities. 
Turnover  and  added value  figures1  (at constant  1967  values)  for 
the aerospace  industries of the EEC,  the  United Kingdom  and  the 
United States are given on  the  next  pages  (Figs. 15  and 16). 
1  The  estimates  for  added  value  must  be  considered in the 
light of a  number  of conditioning factors: 
- the  methods  of calculation employed  by  the various 
sources  used are  probably not strictly comparable; 
- the  original data are  taken  from  national matrices 
for years prior to 1966  and  have  been  brought  up  to 
date  by estimating. 
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 Over  the  period,  the  total aerospace  output  of the  three  zones 
rose  by  36.7%  overall, at an average  rate of 4.6%.per annum. 
The  figures  for  the individual areas are: 
EEC 
United  Kingdom 
United States 
% total increase 
107.5 
12.3 
35.2 
average  increase 
per annum 
11 
1.7 
4.4 
The  increase  was  therefore greatest in the  EEC  and least in the 
United Kingdom,  where  turnover  did  in fact  increase overall 
(but  dropped in certain years). 
The  satisfactory growth of the  EEC  industry is mainly  due  to 
France,  whose  turnover,  accounting as already stated for 71.1% 
of the  EEC  total in 1967,  rose overall by  101.6%  with an aver-
age  increase  of 10.5%  per annum. 
The  different rates of  growth in the  three areas  changed the 
percentage  of total turnover accounted  for  by  each,  as  follows: 
Turnover of the  EEC,  United Kingdom  and United States Aerospace 
Industries as a  Percentage  of Total Turnover 
1960  1967 
EEC  4.3  6.6 
United  Kingdom  7.3  6.0 
United States  88.4  87.4 
Total  100.0  100.0 
The  2.3 points  gained  by  the  EEC  industry were  therefore at 
the  expense  of the British (-1.3)  and  American  (-1)  industries. 
364 From  1960  to 1967,  the  growth of value added  by  the  aerospace 
industries of the  three areas under review was  not  quite  the 
same  as  for  the  increase in turnover as  can  be  seen  from  the 
following tables: 
Growth  of Value  Added  by  the EEC,  United Kingdom  and United 
States Aerospace  Industries 1960-66 
EEC 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Overall 
% total increase  Average  increase 
---------------- per annum 
74.2 
1.8 
42.5 
40.3 
Value  Added  by  the  EEC,  United Kingdom  and United States 
Aerospace  Industries as a  Percentage of Overall 
Added  Value 
1960  1967 
EEC  5.1  6.} 
United Kingdom  9.4  6.8 
United States  85.5  86.9 
Total  100.0  100.0 
These  figures  show  that the annual increase in added value 
exceeded  the  increase in turnover in the United States  (6.1% 
aa  compared  with  4.4%)  but that the reverse  was  true in the 
EEC  and  the United Kingdom  (9.7  and 0.3%  for  the average an-
nual increase in added value as against  11  and  1.7%  for 
turnover). 
365 Com~ing the shares of the  three  industries in turnover and 
total added value  from  1960  to 1967  we  find that: 
- for  the EEC,  added  value  increased less than turnover 
(+1.2 as  compared  with  +2.3%); 
- for the United Kingdom,  added value fell more  than  turnover 
(-2.6 as  compared  with -1.3%); 
-for the  United States,  added value  increased  (1.4%)  while 
turnover  dropped  (-1.0%). 
This indicates one  of the  most  important aspects of our  com-
parison between  the  three  major areas.  We  shall return to this 
point later when  we  have  identified the  importance  of the 
various  factors  in demand  (and  in particular the  weight  of 
government  demand)  and  the  characteristics of the  various 
branches  of production. 
A quantitative approach  can  be  made  to  the last problem by 
estimating the  pattern of aerospace production in the  EEC,  the 
United  Kingdom  and  the United States on  the basis of sales to 
final  customers  in 19671,  as  shown  in the  table  on  the  next 
page  (Fig.  17). 
In the  United States,  government  demand  accounts  for 75.3%  of 
the industry's turnover;  other domestic  sales account  for  15% 
and  exports  for  9%.  From  1960  to 1967,  the  former  increased by 
2  27%  ,  which  was  proportionately less than private  domestic 
demand  with an  increase  of  140%2  achieved  over  the  last two 
years.  The  increase in American  output is therefore  due  es-
sentially to  two  factors,  namely,  the  rise in government 
1  Table  2/5h is reproduced  on  the  next  page  for  ease  of 
reference. 
2  Constant  values. 
366 Fig•  17 
Estimated Pattern of the Output  of the  Aerospace  Industry Based  on  the  Value  of Sales to 
Final Purchasers in  1967 
Government  Other 
Military !Purchases  domestic 
Foreigi  lOTAL  Subsi- purchas-
R&D  TOTAL 
klies1  era 
Values  (millions of current dollars) 
FRAtJCE  246  423  115  784  44  422  1,250 
GERMANY  124  99  9  232  - 29  261 
I TALl(  5  107  - 112  2  46  160 
BELGIUM  - 13  - 13  - 14  27 
NL  - 7  - 7  - 53  60 
TOTI\L  £EC: 
2. 
:575  649  124  1'111.8  46  564  1 ,75'3 
UK  294  574  140  1,008  165  4:57  1,610 
USA  -,7,347  159  17~506  3,503  2,249  23,258 
I  I 
Percentages 
FRANCE  19.7  33,8  9.2  62.7  3.5  3:5,8  100,0 
GEm.:Ar·a  47.5  37,9  3.5  88.9  - 11,1  100,0 
ITALY  3.1  66.9  - 70.0  1.3  28.7  100.0 
BELGIUM  - 48.1  - 48.1  - 51.9  100,0 
Nl.  - 11.7  - 11.7  - 88~3  100.0 
TOTAL  ££(..2.  21.3  36.9  7.1  65.3  2.6  :52.1  100,0 
UK  18_3  ~!).7  8.7  62,7  10,2  27.1  100.0  -
USA  74.6  0,7  75.3  15,0  9.7  1CO.O 
I 
1  Government  finance  for  commercial aviation. 
2  In  1966,  a  total of $16,021  million spent  on  purchases  and military R&D  was  made  up 
of $4,690  million  (30%)  for military  R&D  and  $11,331  million  (70%)  for purchases. 
367 spending,  which  was  decisive,  not  only  because  of its scale1 
but also because  of the  new  branches  to  which it was  directed 
(space,  missiles and  more  sophisticated aircraft),  and, 
secondly,  the  growth  of  commercial aviation,  where  the  sharp 
rise in domestic  demand2  provided major  new  outlets for  the 
American  industry and at the  same  time  offered a  real ·oppor-
tunity for diversification. 
On  the other hand,  there  was  no  substantial change  in demand 
in the United Kingdom  and  the  EEC. 
In both areas,  government  involvement  was  less than in the 
United States  (65-66%  of the industry's turnover),  sales to 
domestic  commercial  operators  were  low3  and exports  were  high, 
accounting for 32.1% of total production in the  EEC  and  27.1% 
in the United Kingdom.  Within  the  European  Community,  France 
ma~e the  biggest  contribution to exports,  with a  figure  of 
4  S422  million  ,  representing 33.8%  of the  national industry's 
turnover. 
1  Over  the  period under review,  government  demand  continuously 
absorbed more  than  80%  of the  industry's turnover  except  in 
the  last few  years. 
2  From  1960  to 1967,  exports rose  by  only  14%  (at constant 
values~ 
3  The  percentage is in fact  down  as  compared  with 1960. 
4 75%  of  EEC  exports. 
368 The  limited character of the  domestic  private market  and the 
1  heavy  dependence  on  exports  leave  the  Community's  aerospace 
industry in a  very delicate position;  the  first factor,  in 
particular,  has  so  far2  militated against any  proper diver-
sification of production and of the risks  involved. 
The  breakdown  of government  expenditure  shows  that the per-
centage  spent  on military  R&D  is almost  identical in the  three 
cases  (30%);  but  there are differences as regards purchases 
~0% in the  EEC  and  the United Kingdom  as against  70%  in the 
United States)  and as regards civil R&D  (around  10%  in the 
EEC  and  the  UK  as against 0.7%  in the  USA)3• 
These  last percentages are  a  sign that both  EEC  and British 
firms: 
- lack sufficient  funds  for  commercial  R&D; 
- assume  only a  limited part of the associated risks; 
- depend  on  government  finance  and  decisions even in the 
case  of commercial aircraft programmes. 
Regarding  the first  two  of these  points,  it should  be  noted 
that,  even  in the United States,  the  government  has  provided 
1  The  opposite applies in the  USA. 
2  With  only  two  notable  exceptions:  the  Caravelle and  the F  27. 
3  Even  though,  in absolute  figures,  the  sums  provided by the 
American  government  for  the  SST  programme,  which  is the  only 
,~  case  of government  support  for  commercial aviation in the 
USA,  exceeded  government  spending in both the  EEC  and  the 
United Kingdom  in 1967. 
369 substantial funds  for major projects such as the  SST.  More-
over,  the  trend seems  likely to  continue,  at least within 
this range;  reliable American  sources1  agree  that in all 
probability it will not  be  possible  to  develop  a  commercial 
VTOL  aircraft without  government assistance in the  form  of a 
military programme  or along the  same  lines as for  the SST. 
It should be  borne  in mind  that the  development  of military 
projects,  which are  obviously  financed  by  the  government,  has 
in many  cases led on  to  the  development  of the  corresponding 
commercial versions in the United States,  particularly in the 
case  of big,  long-range aircraft2• 
This situation is not  repeated in Europe3,  whereno:big military 
transport has  in fact  been  developed. 
In this  c~se also,  the  objective conclusions  which  may  be 
drawn  from  the  figures  will later be  adjusted or at least 
considered in a  wider  context. 
The  third point  would  appear  to be  the  most  difficult;  the 
diversification of  demand  which has  been successfully carried 
through in the  USA  for  the  reasons already indicated  (sharing 
1 
2 
Department  of  Commerce  BDSA  in  "US  Ind~strial Outlook 1968". 
The  outstanding example  is the  Boeing  B 707,  developed  from 
the  military KC  135,  which  opened  the  long-range  jet market 
to the USA;  a  furtLor  example  will almost  certainly be  the 
commercial version  (carrying 800  to  1,000 passengers)  of the 
Lockheed  C 5A·  Galaxy military transport. 
3  Where  the  opposite process  sometimes  occurs;  for  example, 
the British Nimrod  sea reconnaissance aircraft was  developed 
from  the  Comet  4C. 
370 of risks,  optimization of profits,  stability of production 
and  employment)  is not  taking place  in Europe,  with  the  con-
sequences  described. 
Before  proceeding to a  detailed description of production 
trends in the individual branches,  it may  be  helpful to out-
line activities in the aeronautical and missile  fields1in the 
three areas  from  1960 to  1967. 
Over this period,  the United States spent a  total of $22,939 
million2  on  missile  R&D  and  purchases,  covering all fields  of 
research in this sector,  including the  recent addition of the 
anti-missile-missile system.  In Europe,  only France  has  begun 
work  on  projects of any substance  involving major research 
(SSBS  and MSBS). 
As  regards military aircraft,  the United States,  despite  some 
reductions  in expenditure  and activity,  built something like 
16,000 aircraft between  1960 and  1967,  as  compared  with 500 
to 1,000 in the United Kingdom,  1,000 in France  and  1,5003  in 
the  other EEC  cou~~ries. 
The  types  of research undertaken in the  United States and the 
European  countries have  also differed substantially. 
1  For space activities,  Section B of this chapter  (vol. 3).  see 
2  Including $15,016  million  (65.4%)  for  the  Air Force. 
3  Including around  1,000 under  American licence. 
371 In  the United States,  virtually all possible  types  of mili-
1  tary conventional aircraft,  helicopters and  compounds  were 
constructed or developed  between  1960  and  1967. 
Over  the  same  period,  the United Kingdom  produced  one  super-
sonic  fighter,  one  jet strike aircraft and  two  transports 
and  developed  one  V/STOL  tactical fighter and  one  sea recon-
naissance aircraft2• 
On  the  other hand,  the  EEC  industry has  concentrated on 
building fighters,  bombers  and helicopters and,  in France, 
on developing  a  swing-wing aircraft and strike aircraft3, 
while  the  other EEC  countries have  built  one  American aircraft 
under  licence and  have  developed  a  sea reconnaissance aircraft, 
a  ground strike and  trainer aircraft4  and  a  transport. 
The  differences  between  the  United States and Europe  are  even 
more  marked  in the  field of  commercial aircraft. 
From  1960 to 1967,  the United States built about  1,800  jet 
aircraft as  compared  with  230  in the United Kingdom  and  much 
the  same  number  in France. 
1 
2 
The  major programmes  included:  F  105,  F  5,  F  111,  Phantom, 
B 58,  A 4R,  LTV  (A  7  and F  8D),  Grumman  (A  6A,  C  2A,  E 2, 
OV  1,  S  2D),  Orion,  B 70,  Vigilant,  C 130,  UH  1,  Vertol 
(CH  46,  CH  47),  S  61,  S  65,  Lockheed  Cheyenne,  C 5A  Galaxy, 
YF  12A. 
In order:  Lightning,  Buccaneer,  Andover,  Argosy,  Harrier 
and  Nimrod. 
3  Mirage,  Alouette,  Mirage  G and  Jaguar projects. 
4 The  Atlantl..·o  and G  91  tl  r·  d  b  programmes  were  par  y  1..nance  y 
the United States. 
372 The  American  industry has practically monopolized the  market 
1  for  long-range  jets and  medium-range  three-jet types and is 
now  getting ready  to  do  the  same  with the  huge  Jumbo  jets. 
Meanwhile,  Europe  has  concentrated on  medium/short  range 
twin  jets2  and  on  the supersonic  Concorde. 
As  regards  Airbus-type  jets,  the United States are  currently 
engaged  on  the  development  of  two  machines,  the  L  1011  and 
the  DC  10,  while  Europe still delays  a  decision. 
From  the  economic  standpoint  - ignoring the  technological 
advantages  and  direct and  indirect benefits to other branches 
of industry - the  contribution of the aerospace  industry can  be 
measured  by  expressing its turnover as a  percentage  of  the 
gross national product  (A)  and its added  value as  a  percentage 
of value  added  by  manufacturing industry  (B)3,  as  follows: 
(A)  1966 
(B)  1966 
EEC  countries  United Kingdom  United States 
2.7 
6.1 
In both cases  the  figure  for the  aerospace  industry is low  in 
the  EEC  countries,  although B rose  from  0.6%  in 1960  to the 
5  present o.8%  • 
1  Sales of the  comparable  European models  - Comet  4C,  VC  10 
and Trident have  been fairly limited. 
2  Caravella,  BAC  111,  Mercure  (at planning stage). 
3  For  this figure,  see Tables  II/6 and  II/6a. 
4  1964 percentage. 
5  Whereas  B remained almost  constant  in the  USA  from  1960 to 
1966,  the  figure  for  the  United Kingdom  fell from  3.3 to 
2.9%  over the  same  period. 
373 Possibly because  the  percentage is low,  output and added value 
show  much  more  elastic variations than the  American  f·igures. 
The  two  coefficients· of elasticity for  the  EEC  and  the  USA 
are as  follows: 
EEC  USA  -
Aerospace  production in relation to GNP  2.2  0.7 
Aerospace  added  value  in relation to 
manufacturing added  value  2.2  1.0 
Aerospace  added value in relation to GNP  1.9  1 .1 
A cross-section analysis at constant values of the gross 
national product and of aerospace  added value gives a  mean 
coefficient of elasticity of 0.7 for the  EEC  countries taken 
together,  for  the  United Kingdom  and  for  the United States 
(Fig.  18). 
In other words,  while  gross national product per head rose 
by  1%,  added value  per employee  in the aerospace  industry 
rose less than proportionately,  by only 0.7%. 
374 F'IG.  18  Correlation between  GNP  per Head  of Population and Added  Value 
per Employee  in the  Aerospace  Indus~ry 
(Mean  values 1964-66) 
VA  per aerospace 
employee 
(constant 1967  dollars) 
s,ooo 
c,ooo 
1,000 
FRANCE  e 
TOTAL  EtC  • 
ITALY  e 
1,000  2,000  ~,ooo 
375 
e  USA 
r  •  0,7215 
y  •  34se~e.s •  x 0•672'12 
Syx  •  0,0973576 
Sbyx  •  0.2636337 
GNP  per head  (constant 1967 
dollars) 1  4.2.2 By  branches 
Branch 
In  1967,  the  breakdown  by  value  of the  output of the dif-
ferent  branches  of the aerospace  industry in the  three areas 
under review was  as  follows: 
EEC  UK  USA  EEC+UK+USA 
Value  %  Value  %  Value  % Value  % 
($  millions)  ($  millions)  ($  millions)  ($  millions) 
Airframes  2 
Missiles 
(and  space 
vehicles) 
Engines 
Equipment3 
Total 
930  52.9  764  47.5  9,238  39.7  10,932  41.1 
265  15.1  78  4.8  4,753  20.5  5,096  19.1 
402  22.9  608  37.8  4,111  17.6  5,121  19.2 
161  9.1  160  9.9  5,156  22.2  5,477  20.6 
1,758  100.0  1,610  100.0  23,258  100.0  26,626  100.0 
Airframes4  formed  the  biggest  item in aerospace  output in all 
three areas,  with the  other branches roughly  equal at 20%  each. 
1  See  Tables  2 /7,  2 /7a and  2 /8 series. 
2  The  Belgian statistics include missiles and  space 
activities under airframes. 
3  Excluding the  German  industry. 
4  Particularly the  EEC  industry  (in relation to  the  value 
of ita own  output). 
376 Taking the  EEC  figures as unity  we  then have: 
EEC  United Kingdom  United States 
Airframes  1  0.82  9.93 
Missiles  (and 
space vehicles)  1  0.29  17.93 
Engines  1  1.51  10.22 
Equipment  1  0.99  32.02 
Total  1  0.90  13.22 
As  compared  with the United Kingdom,  Community  output is 
slightly higher1  in all branches  except  engines. 
At  the  same  time,  it should be  noted that British production 
is concentrated in a  few  firms  as against the large  number 
operating in the EEC. 
American production is very high,  particularly in the  case  of 
missiles,  space vehicles and aircraft equipment. 
In the period 1960-67,  output  rose  in all three areas
2 
with 
variations between branches as  shown  in the  table  on  the 
next  page  (Fig.  19~ 
These  figures  show  the effort made  by France and Germany  in 
the missiles branch and  by all the  EEC  countries  (except  the 
Netherlands)  in the  engines  branch;  nevertheless  the  absolute 
levels achieved in 1967  were  still not particularly high. 
In the United States,  the average  increase of 6.6%  per annum 
in the airframes  branch was  attained over  the last two  years, 
following  a  sharp downturn. 
1  The  difference  between  the  EEC  and  the  UK  is marked in the 
case  of missiles only. 
2  At  constant  1967  values •. 
377 Fig.  19  EEC  Countries,  United Kinguom  and United States: 
Average  increase  in aerospace  output per annum, 
overall and  by  branches,  1960-67 
~ 
Airframes  Missiles  Engines  Equipment  Total 
and  space 
a  vehicles 
France  +9.4  +16.4  +17.7  +0.3  +10.5 
Germany  +11.9  +25.3  +42.6  1  +16.8  -
Italy  +16.0  - +10.4  +12.1  +13.7 
Belgium  +6.7  - +21.9  - +13.7 
Netherlands  -1.1  - - - -1.1 
Total EEC  +9.3  +17.1  +19.0  +1.9  +11.0 
United Kingdom  +2.3  +2.4  +2.0  -2.2  +1.7 
United States  +6.6  +2.6  +5.5  +2.0  +4.4 
1  No  production  figures  available  for  Germany. 
378 When  the  figures  for  output  by  branches are  combined with those 
for numbers  employed  for  the years 19631 and  1967  (Figs.  20 
and  21) 1  analysis of the  percentage  of each in the total for 
the  branch reveals the  following  facts: 
- in the United States,  rises or falls in numbers  employed 
are  matched,  in each branch,  by  changes  in the  output  figure; 
- in the United Kingdom,  the  same  applies  (except  in the  equip-
ment  branch)  but  to a  lesser extent; 
- on  the  other hand,  the  position in the  EEC  is as  follows: 
airframes brancht  a  slight drop  in the  employment  figure 
from  14.9 to  13.4%  is accompanied  by  a 
sharp  drop  in the  share  in total output 
(from 13.5 to 8.5%). 
Missiles branch:  slight increase in the  employment  percentage 
and sharp  increase in the  output percentage. 
Engines branch:  slight increase in both the  e~ployment and 
the  output percentages;  in France  the  former 
remained constant at 8.7%  while  the  produc-
tion figure  rose  from  3.7 to 5.6%. 
Equipment  branch:  the  employment  percentage  remained steady 
while the  output  figure  fell slightly. 
The  relationship  Qetween  output  and  numbers  employed  can be 
expressed in terms  of  turnover per employee  (Fig.  22);  this 
presentation may  possibly illustrate the  above  percentage 
variations more  clearly and it can  further be  noted that2: 
1 
2 
First year for  which reliable data are available  concerning 
the distribution of employment  by  branches in the  United 
Kingdom. 
In addition to the  area-by-area  comparison  in Section 2.4 
below. 
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 - the  value  of output per employee  rose substantially in 
France  except  in the  equipment  branch,  but fell sharply in 
all branches in the  other EEC  countries.  This is not sur-
prising in view  of the  fact  that,  in 1963,  Germany,  Italy, 
Belgium and  the  Netherlands were  heavily engaged  on  the 
production of military aircraft under licence.  On  the other 
hand,  France  followed  another line,  directed mainly  to the 
development  and production of its own  aircraft or  to  joint 
R&D  programmes. 
- the  influence of the  recent  demand  for  commercial aircraft 
and  the  resumption of military orders is clearly apparent 
in the United States  (increase in output per head in the 
airframe  and  engine  branches),  as is the relative falling 
off of missile  and space  programmes,  which is reflected by 
the  reduced value  of output per head in this branch and  by 
the falling off in the  equipment  branch. 
Lastly,  it should be  stressed that the  Community  industry 
has  succeeded,  owing mainly  to the  French contribution,  in 
developing  a  number  of original programmes  in the  airframe 
and missile branches1•  Particularly as regards airframes, 
a  number  of very interesting military programmes  and  of 
short/medium range  commercial aircraft have  been  developed 
in succession.  The  main effort is now  concentrated  on  super-
sonic flight  (with  the Franco-British Concorde)  and,  at 
study level,  on  VTOL  aircraft  (especially in Germany). 
In the  engine  branch,  however,  the  Community  industry,  de-
spite considerable efforts,  is still unable  to  compete  and 
depends  on  the  main  foreign  constructors in the United 
States and  the  United Kingdom. 
1 
Full details of programmes  are  given in the  "National 
Reports". 
383 4.3 Productivity1 
The  indices used  to  compare  productivity in the  three areas 
(EEC,  United Kingdom,  Jnited States)  in 19662  were  in turn 
compared  with  the  value  of production and  costs per  employee, 
as set out  in the  table  below: 
Aerospace  industry  EEC  United  United 
(1966)  Kingdom  States 
2 
Val..llf.: of output per 
employee  $  9,509  6,515  18,562 
Added  value  2  per 
6,1003  4,192 4  12,1793  employee  $ 
Added  value as a 
percentage  of out-
put  %  64.1  64.4  65.6 
Annual  cost per 
employee  $  4,815  3,315  8,655 
Cost  of labour as 
a  percentage  of 
added value  %  78.8  79.0  71.0 
Cost  of labour as 
a  percentage  of 
value  of output  %  50.6  50.9  46.6 
1  Added  value/number  employed. 
2  At  current values. 
3  At  factor  cost. 
4 At  k  i  mar  et pr ces. 
384 Taking  output per head and  added value  per head  to be  unity 
for  the  EEC,  the  comparable  figures  for  the United Kingdom 
and the United States are as  follows1: 
Va~ue of output per head 
Added  value  per head 
EEC 
1 
1 
UK  USA 
0.68  1.95 
0.68  1.99 
It will be  seen that  the  American  figures  for  value  of  output 
per head and value  added per head are 1.95 and 1.99 times  the 
corresponding  EEC  figures  and 2.84 and 2.9 times  the British 
values. 
Again  taking the  EEC  figure  as unity,  the  relative cost of 
labour in the  three areas  is as  follows: 
EEC  UK  USA 
Cost  of labour  1  o.68  1.79 
Cost  per employee  in the  United States was  therefore 1.79  times 
the  EEC  figure  and 2.6  times  the British figure. 
Some  reserves  may  be  expressed  concerning the  comparability of 
the  data used  because  returns are  not  compiled  on  the  same  basis 
for either added value  or manpower  (on this point,  see  the pre-
vious  chapter). 
There are no  such reserves  concerning the  figures  for  numbers 
employed  and  value  of output.  However,  the  differences between 
value  of output  per head  and  added value  per head are strictly 
in proportion  for  the  three areas under review;  since  added 
value as  a  percentage  of production is also virtually iden-
tical for the  three areas,  the  magnitudes  of the values  con-
sidered would  appear  to  be  acceptable  in principle. 
1  The  series for  the  period 1960-70 are  given in Tables  2/9 
and  2/10. 
385 The  following  remarks are therefore appropriate: 
1)  -The higher proportion of labour costs to added  value in 
Europe  (both in the  EEC  and  the  UK)  as  compared  with the 
USA  is evidence  of  lower amortization  costs in Europe  as 
against  the  USA,  because  they relate to substantially 
lower  inveotments,  and  of lower return earned  by  the 
European aerospace  industry as  compared  with its American 
counterpart. 
'  2)  - The  higher proportion of labour costs to value  of output 
in Europe  (both the  EEC  and  the  UK)  as  compared  with  the 
United States reflects the  relative cost  of labour  in 
the  three areas. 
3)  - The  practically identical proportion of added value  to 
output in all three areas  suggests  (on  the  basis of  the 
reciprocal relationships  between  the  various  internal 
factors affecting the  formation of added  value)  that the 
breakdown  between  internal inputs and  factors  in the aero-
space  industry is structurally similar in the  three areas. 
The  difference  in output per head  between  the  three  areas 
(the  American  figure  is almost  twice  that  for  the  EEC  and 
three  times  that  for  the United  Kingdom~ taken together 
with  the  equal percentage  of inputs in output,  can  only 
mean  that it takes  twice  as  long in the  EEC  and  three 
times  as  long  in the  United  Kingdom  to  turn  out  a  similar 
product. 
This  ratio is probably  too  low  in the aircraft sector 
proper in view of  the  higher percentage  of missile  and 
space  production in the  USA  (20%  of the  total)  as  com-
pared with Europe  (15%  in the  EEC  and  4.8%  in the UK), 
where  production times are proportionately longer than 
386 in the aircraft sector because  of the small  numbers 
produced. 
The  difference in output per head  between  the  three 
areas is partly,  but substantially,  offset by  the  dif-
ferences  in labour costs between  the  USA,  the  EEC  and 
the  UK.  It may  therefore  be  concluded  that  the  only point 
at which the European industry is almost  competitive is 
linked with the  lower  cost of labour  • 
.  It should  be  noted,  however,  that  between  1959  and  1966 
the  cost of labour in the  aerospace  industry rose  by  78% 
in the EEC,  48%  in the United Kingdom  and  only 31%  in the 
United States. If, as  seems  likely,  this trend continues, 
the  competitivity of the  European aerospace  industry, 
which is based solely on  labour costs,  would  be  wiped 
out fairly quickly. 
There  is almost  certain to  be  a  trend  towards  equalization 
of wages  because,  as is well known,  less-developed coun-
tries are  carried along  by  the  more  developed. 
- The  difference noted in output per head  between  the  three 
areas is probably  due  to  the  following  factors: 
(a)  Better organization and  management  in the  American 
industry as  compared  with the  EEC  and  UK  industries. 
Such  management  takes  the  form  of  the  identification 
of patterns of production adapted  to the  final prod-
uct,  with all the  consequent  economies  of scale,  the 
harmonization of factors,  the  optimization of size as 
compared with the position in Europe,  where  the  prod-
uct is generally adapted to use  existing and  under-
employed  structures and  factors. 
387 (b)  Bigger investments in the  American aerospace in-
dustries in machinery and  equipment  as  compared  with 
1  Europe  ,  with a  consequent  increase  in labour pro-
ductivity. 
(c)  Achievement,  in the United States,  but  not in Europe, 
of  optimum  production  flows  which  benefit  from  the 
effects of the  learning curve  and  therefore  minimize 
labour costs per unit  produced.  It may  be  noted in 
this connection that in Europe  the  country with the 
biggest  output  per head  - France  - is also the  coun-
try which has  achieved  the  longest  runs  for  equiv-
alent or similar types  with its Caravella and various 
military aircraft,  although the  total length of the 
period  over  which  these  runs  were  completed has part-
ly cancelled out  the  effects of the  learning curve. 
(d)  Government  spending on  R&D  and  the production of 
aircraft, missiles and  space  material,  which is a 
higher percentage in the  United States  than  in Eu-
rope,  aims at the  maximum  return for  the  lowest  costs. 
With  organized and  competitive  sources  of supply 
(which  do  not  exist in the  individual European  coun-
tries)  this policy is a  strong incentive  to ration-
alize structures and increase  the productivity of 
all the  factors  involved. 
Here  again,  the  outstanding example  is France,  where 
increased government  subsidies  for  R&D  and  a  rise in 
production are  accompanied  by  a  level of productivity 
higher than that achieved in the  other  EEC  countries 
and  the United  Kingdom.  Nevertheless,  a  contracting 
1  See  Section 2.2.4. 
388 policy aimed  more  at raising productivity might  have 
produced  even  more  outstanding results in this case. 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
5.1  General Remarks 
In  the  preceding pages  we  have  described  the  main  features  of 
the  EEC  aerospace  industry as  compared  with the  American and 
British industries. 
By  way  of conclusions,  we  feel that  we  should recall the  most 
obvious  and  abnormal  differences revealed by  this  comparison 
and  should indicate their apparent  and  hidden  causes. 
The  validity of our  comparison  may  perhaps  be  contested on 
grounds  of methods,  eince  the industries under review operate 
in different national circumstances and serve markets  of varying 
size. 
In our view,  this comment  is not  wholly  justified,  because  the 
aerospace  industry  can  be  regarded as aiming at an  open  world 
market,  within  which  the  American  industry is the  uncontested 
leader with products  of  the  highest  quality at more  than  com-
petitive prices. 
Only  by  investigating the  causes  which  have  produced this 
leadership  can  we  find  guidance  for  an action policy designed 
to remove  the  restrictions which  have  hitherto prevented the 
European aerospace  industry  from  occupying the  important posi-
tion to  which it is entitled. 
The  most  important subjects for  thought  from  this  chapter 
would  seem  to be: 
- European aerospace  firms  are  not big enough. 
389 Even  when  the  biggest European  companies are set against 
their American  counterparts,  there is no  real comparison; 
this is amply  proved  by  the  single fact  that,  in 1967,  the 
total output  of the  five  biggest EEC  firms  added to that 
of the  three  biggest in the United Kingdom  did not  amount  to 
60%  of the  output  of the  biggest  American aerospace  company 
or to  75%  of the  fifth in size. 
A big undertaking ensures reaching the  levels required for 
the  production of  optimum  runs  of aircraft,  with maximum 
economies  of scale,  maximum  reliability thanks  to the se-
quence  of large  government  orders and substantial commercial 
orders and  the  capacity to  carry through major  programmes 
independently. 
In Europe,  considerable efforts have  been  made  towards  the 
financial and  economic  concentration of aerospace  firms,  but 
no  serious attempt  has  been  made  to  bring production struc-
tures into line with  the  new  financial  and  economic  dimen-
sions. 
The  smallness,  dispersal and  sub-division of plant prevent 
the  concentration of technical  investments  and  the  adoption 
of new  methods  of organization which are  the  hallmark of 
the  American  industry. 
The  value  of output per head varies very  widely  between  the 
aerospace  industries of the  EEC,  the United Kingdom  and  the 
United States  (the  American  figure  is almost  twice  that for 
the  EEC  and  three  times  that  for  the  United Kingdom). 
Since  the  percentages  of  external and internal inputs in 
production are practically the  same,  this means  that pro-
ductivity per head is almost  twice  as  high in the  American 
industry as in the  EEC  industry and  three  times as  high as 
390 in that  of the United  Kingdom. 
This  brings  us  back  to  our earlier observations  concerning 
the organization and  size of  firms;  we  would again stress 
that with the high labour intensity which is a  feature  of 
the  industry in all three areas,  the  only possibility of 
offsetting Europe's  low productivity at present lies in the 
relatively low  cost of labour.  However,  in view  of the  trend 
which is likely to cancel out this factor in the  fairly near 
future,  it is obvious  that action will have  to be  directed to 
structural features  and  to  investments  to overcome  what is 
the  most  unfavourable  feature  of the  European aerospace in-
dustry. 
It may  be  noted that variations in productivity per head 
between Europe  and  the  United States are  much  the  same  in 
many  other branches  of manufacturing industry as in the  aero-
space sector. 
In particular,  even  in  the  motor  vehicle  industry,  which is 
easier to  compare,  the  difference  in productivity per head 
is of the  same  order as  for manufacturing industry as  a  whole. 
However,  in the  specific case  of  the aerospace  industry this 
difference in productivity leaves European aircraft firms 
with a  completely unsatisfactory return;  in other branches 
of industry,  the productivity gap  is largely made  good  and 
firms'  earn a  high  enough  return to  provide  completely ade-
quate profits and  funds  for self-financing. 
Over  and  above  the  difference in labour costs,  which also 
applies to aerospace activities,  the  other branches  of manu-
facturing  industry benefit  from  a  further substantial "geo-
graphical return". 
Indeed,  for  almost all branches of industry except  the 
391 aerospace  branch,  European  demand  (government  and private) 
still turns  for preference  to  firms  operating within the 
European market  and,  in the  case  of the  European  Community, 
to  firms  operating in member  countries. 
In the  case of the aerospace  branch,  the  "geographical return'' 
would  appear to  be  very slight. 
To  begin with,  the  cost of transporting the  finished prod-
ucts cannot,  by definition,  be  very high;  nor is the  coat of 
transporting inputs of appreciable  significance. 
Secondly,  in this branch the  special features  of national 
demand  do  not  provide  a  "geographical return",  i.e.,  advan-
tages  for  local manufacturers. 
The  structure of this industry  i~ of  course,  characterized 
by  the  fact that military demand  is in the  hands  of single 
customers  in each  country and  the  demand  for  commercial air-
craft is in the  hands  of a  tight  group  of  customers  (in the 
European  countries there is in fact  only  one  flag  company 
and  even  in the  United States there are  not  many  airline 
companies  which  have  a  significant effect  on  demand). 
On  the  supply side,  there is a  tight world  group  of pro-
ducers  (or at least in the  Western  countries). 
In these  circumstances,  the  characteristics of  demand  are 
very similar and,  within certain limits,  there are  no  sep-
arate or differentiated markets. 
- As  compared  with the  American aerospace  industry,  the 
return on  capital and capital turnover are  very  low  in 
the  EEC  and British aerospace  industries.  For  1966  (the 
last year  for  which  comparable  data  could be  obtained), 
we  have  the  following  figures  for  some  of the  biggest 
aerospace  firms  in France  (no  information  could  be  obtained 
392 for  the  other EEC  countries),  the United Kingdom  and  the 
United States: 
Profits as percentage of own  capital 
France  UK  USA 
3.80 
Annual  rate of turnover of total net assets 
(number of times per year) 
France  UK  USA 
0.56  1.12  2.1 
We  consider that the  position in the  other EEC  countries 
was  much  the  same  as in France. 
In these  circumstances,  we  feel that  the  aerospace  industry 
is not  particularly likely to attract resources and  capital 
in Europe;  but  the  situation is reversed in the  United 
States,  where  the aerospace  industry has  now  become  the 
biggest  customer for  capital and  resources  in the  whole 
economy. 
Output  in all three  areas  under  review rose  almost  contin-
uously,  with an average  increase  of  11%  per annum  in the 
EEC,  1.7%  in the United Kingdom  and  4.4%  in the United 
States. 
It should  be  added,  however,  that in 1966-67  the  average 
rate of increase per annum  was  17.4%  in the United States 
as against 7.4%  for  the  EEC  and  a  decline  of 2.6%  for  the 
United Kingdom. 
While  the  EEC  trend may  appear satisfactory at first sight, 
a  more  detailed analysis reveals  the  following: 
393 The  rise in production in the  EEC  from  1960  to 1967  was 
mainly  due  to an  increase in government  purchases and 
R&D  contracts,  from  $427  million in 1960  to $1,148  mil-
lion in 1967. 
In the United States  the  rise was  due  to a  combination 
of increased government  expenditure,  rising from  $12,124 
million in 1960  to $17,506  million in 1967,  and higher 
sales to other countries,  increasing  from  $1,282  million 
in 1960  to $3,503 million in 1967. 
- In the  United States  the  rising trend of output  has  been 
associated with  a  process  of reorganization,  with the 
following  features: 
a)  firms  have  reached practically optimal size; 
b)  risks  have  been shared between military and  civil 
production,  with the biggest  firms  aiming at parity; 
c)  long-term integration and  programming  of government 
finance  and  private investment; 
d)  the  biggest and  leading firms  in the  industry,  who 
hold  the  contracts and  jointly organize  the  whole 
complex sub-contracting system,  operate  so  that the 
whole  industry benefits,  on  a  centralized basis,  from 
government  contracts and  finance1; 
e)  production units specialize in specific types  of 
finished product,  so  that duplication of assembly, 
coordination,  purchases,  etc.,  is eliminated; 
f)  marketing times  have  been  cut  (time  from  the  start of 
specific  R&D  to the  delivery of the  first production 
1  In 1966,  82.5%  of all NASA  contracts  were  concentrated 
in the  hands  of five  aerospace  firms. 
394 aircraft)  from  five  years  for  the  Boeing 707  to  three 
years  for  the Boeing 747); 
On  the  other hand,  the  position was  as  follows  in Europe 
over the  same  period: 
a)  except  in France,  governmentshave  intervened only 
occasionally or  to provide  temporary  economic  support 
and  have  never produced definite programmes  for re-
organizing the  industry. 
b)  economic  and  financial  concentration has  taken place 
but  this has  not  spread to organization and  structure, 
so that there  has been  no  major specialization of 
firms; 
c)  the almost  total lack of commercial  production has 
prevented the  sharing or risks between civil and 
military production; 
d)  joint industrial projects have  in no  case  furthered 
operational centralization but  have  in almost all 
cases led to  the  doubling or trebling of production 
and assembly lines; 
e)  marketing  times  have  remained virtually unchanged 
(eight  years  for  the  Comet,  seven  for  the Caravella 
and six for  the  VC  10). 
All these  obvious structural and  operational shortcom-
ings in the  European aerospace  industry are  the  product 
of a  single factor  from  which  they derive. 
In our opinion,  this factor is the inability of the 
European aerospace  industry,  and  of the  public author-
ities concerned with it, to programme  and  carry through 
(dealing with all the  associated problems  of R&D,  ma~kets, 
marketing,  etc.  together)  the  production of  optimum  runs 
395 which  can benefit  from  the effects of the learning curve 
and  can  impose all the advanced  forms  of organization 
which are vital to complete  such rune. 
5.2 Projections for  the  Eighties 
From  sheer curiosity,  we  have  extrapolated the  existing data 
1  (at constant prices)  to produce  a  number  of graphs  tenta-
tively forecasting  employment  figures,  output per head and 
added value  per head  for  the  EEC,  the United Kingdom  and the 
United States,  on  the assumption that the  trend observed 
from  1960  to 1967  remains  constant. 
Such an extrapolation is unreliable  for  the  following reasonss 
- The  output  of the  EEC  aerospace  industry in the  seventies, 
calculated from  the  extrapolation for  output per head and 
numbers  per head,  is wholly incompatible,  as regards the 
EEC's  possible share,  with our estimates of the size of 
the  overall market  for aerospace products during the  same 
period; 
- The  forecast  of added value  per head in the  EEC  is valid 
only if it is assumed  that  labour costs in the  Community 
will move  into line with the  present  cost in the United 
States. 
The  forecast  of added  value  per head in the USA  will only 
be  fulfilled if there is a  proportionate increase in factor 
costa which  seems  unlikely in the light of past trends.  On 
the  contrary,  it is probable that the present figure  for 
added value  per head in the United States already repre-
sents an  optimum  percentage distribution between external 
1  See Tables  2/11,  2 /12 and  2 /13. 
396 and internal inputs in production. 
The  rising trend of EEC  output in recent years is due  to 
the  following  three  factors: 
1)  the  exceptional effort made  by France  (in terms  of 
government  expenditure)  which  cannot  be  expected to 
continue at the  same  level of spending in future; 
2)  the  re-equipment  of European air forces,  now  completed; 
it may  reasonably  be  assumed  that replacements  but no 
additions will be  required in future; 
3)  the technical,  organizational and  financial  decision of 
the United States to unify and rationalize aircraft and 
missiles within  NATO;  this is unlikely to be  repeated 
on  the  same  scale. 
Rather than reason in terms  of extrapolation trends, all who 
have  direct or  indirect responsibility for the EEC  aerospace 
industry will therefore have  to work  out  reasoned and rea-
sonable  forecasts,  based  on  an analysis  of structures and  of 
the  market  and  then use  this  joint forecast  to formulate  the 
elements of a  policy which will be  directed first and  fore-
most  to reorganize all the  firma  in the  industry,  in order 
to make  them really competitive  and  give  them  an  organization 
compatible  with the  technical and  commercial problems associ-
ated with aerospace  production. 
In our view,  the  market  opportunities to  justify such an 
effort are  not  lacking.  The  likely demand  for  both military 
and civil purposes  over the next  ten years is substantial; 
in particular,  the  trend towards  diversification of aircraft 
types  must  not  be  overlooked as it could offer major outlets 
for  the  European  industry. 
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404 Sources of data  for  production,  employment  and  added  value 
As  stated in our introduction,  our sources  of information 
varied so greatly that they  had  to  be  scrutinized and  eval-· 
uated very  carefully in order to  produce  comparable  data. 
We  obtained our production and  employment  figures  from  the 
following  sources  (by  countries): 
a)  France:  USIAS  - L'industrie aeronautique et spatiale 
1960-67. 
b)  Germany:  the official German statistics for  the aeronau-
tical industry are published by  the Federal Statistical 
Office  ("Statistisches Bundesamt")  in the  annual Statisti-
cal Yearbooks  under  the head.ing  "Aircraft Conctructio:r:."  in 
the  section dealing with  "Capital goods  industries".  The 
term "aircraft construction" is not  defined in the year-
books  but it can  be  deduced  from  the  number  of  firms  and 
employees  that this ceading covers  only the aircraft in-
dustry proper,  comprising the  production of airframes, 
engines  and  missiles,  to  the  exclusion of  branches  making 
non-electronic  equipment. 
Hence,  since  we  used  the  official statistics and  had  no 
basis  for  estimating for  the  equipment  branch,  the  German 
employment  and  production  figures  are  too  low. 
c)  Italy:  the statistics for  the  Italian aeronautical and 
space  industry were  derived  from  the  following publica-
tions: 
1.  ISTAT,  4th General Census  of Industry and Trade,  16 
October 1961 
2.  ISTAT,  value  added  by  undertakings  1961-65,  Notes  and 
Reports  No.  34,  November  1967 
405 3.  Confindustria,  Study and Statistical Division. 
Outlook for  Italian industry 
. 4.  Ministry for  the  Budget  and  Economic  Planning,  Working 
Group  on  the  Aircraft Industry.  Final Report,  Rome, 
July 1967 
5.  Statistical Office of the  European  Communities, 
11Input-Output11  Tables  for  the  countries of the Euro-
pean Economic  Community,  December  1965 
6. Statistical Office of the  European  Communities, 
Statistical Studies and  Surveys,  1968  Supplement. 
The  figures  used  in this chapter are  taken  from  sources 
1,  2,  5  and 6  combined  with information supplied by indi-
vidual aerospace  firms;  the  series for  numbers  employed 
in the  aerospace  industry  was  not  calculated  from  the 
sources listed. 
Source  3  mentions  the aerospace  industry  from  1960  to 
1962  and  in 1965  only;  the relevant data were  used  for 
comparison. 
d)  Belgium:  The  official Belgian statistics classify aero-
space  firms  under  the  wider industrial heading  "Mechan-
ical engineering11  and  therefore  do  not  give separate  data 
for  the  aerospace  industry.  The  figures  in this chapter 
were  calculated  from  the Trade  Union  Seminar1  of Mr  Decoster, 
National Secretary of the  "Centrale  des Mitallurgistea" 
1  OECD.  Regional  Trade  Union  Seminar,  Paris,  21-22 Sept. 
1966.  These  figures  were  corrected,  on  the  basis of 
others supplied by  the aerospace  firms,  to  eliminate 
electronics  firms. 
406 and  from  the  "Input-Output" Table  for  1959,  Heading  48, 
Aircraft Construction1• 
e)  Netherlands:  No  official Netherlands statistics give 
figures  for  the  aeronautical and  space  industry. 
The  data  for  employment,  production and  added value in 
the  aerospace  industry were,  therefore,  estimated on  the 
basis of  figures2  taken  from  the Fokker  Company's  annual 
reports,  and  the  data given  in the  "Input-Output" Table 
for  1959,  Heading  48,  Aircraft  Construction3• 
1 
Source:  Statistical Office  of the  European  Communities, 
"Input-Output" Tables  for  the  countries  of the European 
Economic  Community,  December  1965. 
2  Mainly:  employment,  hours  of  work,  wages,  investments, 
depreciation and profits. 
3 Source:  Statistical Office  of the  European  Communities, 
"Input-Output" Tables  for  the  countries  of  the  European 
Economic  Community,  December  1965. 
407 f)  United Kingdom:  In the British statistics,  the aircraft 
industry appears  under Part 8  "Vehicles" of  Heading 383 
of  the  Minimum  List of the  Standard Industrial Classifi-
cation,  which  classifies firms  on  the  basis of 51%  of 
the  main  type  of activity. 
Heading 383  of the  SIC  describes  the aircraft industry 
as  follows: 
"383  - Aircraft Manufacturing and Repairing 
Manufacturing and assembling airframes or  complete air-
craft and gliders,  guided missiles;  modifying  or repairing 
airframes and aircraft. Manufacture  and  repair of aero-
engines and  power  plant.  Manufacturing parts and acces-
sories other than electrical and electronic  equipment is 
included".  Although not specified,  this heading also in-
cludes  firms  making  hovercraft;  in addition,  over half the 
numbers  employed  on  space  research are  considered  to be 
employed  in the aircraft industry.  The  reason  for this 
is that "hovercraft" and  "space" are  not  separate  items 
in the  SIC,  because  they have  come  into being since  the 
statistical headings  were  last revised. 
g)  United States 
Employment 
The  figures  for  total numbers  employed  in the various 
branches of the  aerospace  industry were  taken  from  two 
sources:  "AIA  Facts and Figures,  196811  and  "USA  Indus-
trial Outlook,  196811 ,  published by  the  US  Department of 
Commerce,  BDSA. 
408 The  two  sources  do  not agree  either as regards  the total 
numbers  employed  or as regards their breakdown  by  branches, 
because  they use  different classifications,  as  follows: 
US  Industrial Outlook,  1968 
a)  Complete  airframes for aircraft  (SIC  3721); 
b)  Engines  and  their components  for aircraft,  missiles 
and  space  vehicles  (SIC  3722  and 3723); 
c)  Missiles and  space  vehicles  (SIC  1925); 
d)  Components  and  equipment  (SIC  3729). 
Aerospace  Industries Association of America,  Inc. 
a)  Aircraft:  sub-divided into airframes  and  engines  and 
power  plant,  with general reference  to SIC  372. 
b)  Missiles and  space  work:  this  comprises  "the  employees 
in the aircraft,  complete  missile  and  space  and  elec-
tronic industries,  engaged  in missile  and  space  work", 
as  well as  "employees  in the electrical machinery in-
dustry  (SIC  36)  engaged in missile  and  space  work". 
c)  Others:  includes  employees  in industry classification 
(SIC  28,  35,  38,  73,  89  and  others)  engaged in mis-
aile and  space  work. 
The  AlA  statistics also  include  among  employees  in the 
aerospace  industry a  number  of employees  from  non-
aerospace  branches  (SIC 36,  28,  35,  38,  73,  89  and  others) 
while  the  returns of the  US  Department  of  Commerce  are 
based  on  the  SIC aerospace  headings  only. 
While  quoting  the  AIA  figures1,  therefore,  because  they 
1  In Annex  7,  "Description of the  United States Aerospace 
Industry". 
409 come  from  the  industrial association and  represent a 
1  wider  phenomenon  ,  the  Department  of Commerce  returns 
are  used in this chapter both because  they are  more  re-
levant and  because  they are  more  in line with the  sta-
tistics of the  EEC  countries and  the  United  Kingdom. 
Output 
The  statistics for  the  value  of output,  or better for 
2  sales,  of the  American  aerospace industry are estimates 
published annually  by  the  Aerospace  Industries Associa-
tion of  America  Inc.,  in "Aerospace Facts and Figures". 
Other American publications dealing with the  subject 
include: 
- "US  Industrial Outlook",  published annually by  the  US 
Department  of  Commerce,  BDSA.  In this  document,  sales 
by  the  American  aerospace  industry are  related to the 
relevant SIC  headings,  as  follows:  3721,  3722,  3723, 
3729  and  19253; 
- "Current Industrial Report",  issued by  the  US  Bureau 
of Census;  reports and balance-sheet data  for  the  60 
leading  American aerospace  firms4; 
1 
2 
Because  the  employment  figures  for  the  aerospace  in-
dustry include  a  number  of employees  from  other branches 
of industry whose  output is absorbed  by  the  aerospace 
industry. 
"Estimated sales of the  aerospace  industry by  product 
group"  in  "Aerospace Facts and Figures",  1968,  page  8, 
and 1Estimated sales of the  aerospace  industry by  custom-
er",  page  9  of  the  same  report. 
3  The  SIC Classification is based  on  firms'  main activities. 
4  The  turnover of  these  firms  accounts  for  about  80%  of 
that of  the  whole  industry. 
410 - various publications of the  National Science Foundation 
concerning research and  development  in the United 
States,  including:  "Research and  Development  in  Indus-
try''  (published annually)  and  "Federal Funds  for Re-
search,  Development  and Other Scientific Activities" 
(issued every thxee  years). 
The  data produced  by  the  AIA  are  those  most  often  quoted 
in specialized publications and  reviews;  moreover,  as 
they  come  from  the industrial association,  they must  be 
given  due  weight  and are,  therefore,  reproduced in 
Tables  4-7· 
However,  the  following  comments  must  be  made  concerning 
the  turnover figures  for  the  American  aeropsace  industry 
as given  by  the  AIA: 
- they are  estimates and not  verified figures; 
all government  expenditure  on aerospace  R&D  is included 
in the aerospace  industry's turnover  by  the  AIA
1
• 
Confirmation that this method  is used  to  estimate  the 
industry's turnover is obtained by  comparing  the  AIA  data 
with those  of the  National Science Foundation2  for  R&D 
expenditure,  as set out  in ''Facts and Figures,  1968"3• 
1 
2 
Adjusted,  using  mean  values,  to relate  government  ex-
penditure  during the  fiscal year  (1  July to 30  June)  to 
the  calendar year. 
National Science Foundation:  Research  and  Development 
in Industry,  1966  (NSF  68-20). 
3  Op.  cit.,  page  66:  Industrial R&D,  all industries and 
the aerospace  industry;  calendar years 1956  to date. 
411 From  this comparison it would  appear  that the  AIA  in-
cluded all government  expenditure  on aerospace  R&D  in 
the  aerospace  ind~stry's turnover and  not  merely  the 
sums  which  went  to  the  industry itself;  the  difference, 
which is in fact  quite substantial,  comprises  internal 
expenditure  by  the  government  agencies  and  sums  going  to 
non-aerospace  industries  for  R&D  relating to aerospace 
products. 
In view  of this fact,  and  the  need  to  have  data  compa-
rable with  those  produced for  the  European  countries,  a 
fresh estimate  had  to be  made  for  the  total turnover of 
the  aerospace  industry and  for its distribution by  final 
customer. 
Thus  reconstituted,  the  variously distributed output  of 
the aerospace  products  of the  American  aerospace  industry 
was  subjected to various  checks,  with the  following 
results: 
- the  estimated figures  do  not  vary  unduly  from  those  in 
the  Bureau  of  Census  "Current  Industrial Report", 
Series M 37  D,  verified as  from  1961  from  the  balance 
sheets  of.the  60  biggest aerospace  firms  in the  United 
States,  which,  as  already stated,  account  for about 
80%  of  American aerospace  output  by value. 
- the  same  remark applies  to  the  comparison  with the 
figures  published  by  the  US  Department  of  Commerce, 
BDSA,  in the  US  Industrial Outlook,  1968,  with ref-
erence  to  SIC  items  3721,  3722,  3723,  3729  and  1925 
(i.e.,  the  items relating more  specifically to aero-
space  activitie~; 
SORIS  estimates  of government  expenditure  on  R&D  in 
the  aerospace  industry agree  with the  figures  of the 
412 National Science Foundation for SIC  items  372  and 19. 
Except  in the  cases of the  Netherlands and the United 
States,  value added  by  the aerospace  industry is derived 
from  national matrices. 
In the  case of data for  years prior to 1966,  an estimate 
was  made  for subsequent  years by  extrapolating the ini-
tial data  on  the  basis of the  index  for  the rise in 
labour costs. 
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